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ABSTRACT 
This comparative case-study analysis of civil-military relations (CMR) in 
Lithuania and Mongolia reveals similar challenges leading to ineffective and inefficient 
security governance that undermines public trust and confidence in strategic decisions 
made by those governments. Although the largely successful democratic transition in 
those former Soviet states has led to Western-style CMRs well defined in 
constitutional-legal terms, it has yet to achieve depoliticized security governance due to 
persisting political, socio-economic, cultural, and security legacies. These legacies, as 
well as a lack of underdeveloped or unutilized mechanisms and tools, thwart unbiased 
leadership and transparent management. Civil society in each of the countries studied 
lacks the essential capacity to contribute not only to effective oversight and public 
scrutiny, but to a judiciary free from corruption and capable of earning the public’s trust. 
Similarly, the study finds these problems fully correlate with CMR challenges in the 
Republic of Georgia, another former Soviet state and consolidating democracy. Solutions 
recommended by this study include increased Western demand and support for further 
democratic progress, and the exploration of innovative ways to build public trust and 
confidence in security governance and the democratic way governance in general. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
Democratic civilian control over the security sector represents a core concern of the 
field of modern civil-military relations (CMR) and has largely determined the degree of 
success of democratic consolidation in post-Soviet space. Most of the former communist 
states have undergone painful and turbulent transitions from authoritarian rule to Western 
democratic models—with different degrees of success. Such states as Belarus or 
Kazakhstan have formed as solid autocracies and personalized regimes, while the Baltic 
States—Georgia, Mongolia, and Ukraine—are achieving considerable progress in 
democratic consolidation.  
This thesis examines the existing challenges to democratic civilian control over the 
security sectors in consolidating democracies, focusing on former communist states. It 
outlines the essential strengths and vulnerabilities embedded in political systems, 
institutional frameworks, and cultural settings of two consolidating democracies with a 
significant communist past: Lithuania and Mongolia. Conclusions and recommendations 
in this thesis also reflect solutions to similar challenges in Georgia—another consolidating 
democracy with a significant Soviet past and the author’s home nation. The primary 
research question of this work is: What are the challenges of democratic civilian 
control over the security sector?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis emphasizes the significance of institutional frameworks, transparent 
policy development, and implementation oversight as critical dimensions for democratic 
civilian control and observes a variety of factors leading to vulnerabilities undermining the 
process of democratic consolidation. The selected countries share a communist past, a 
continuous effort for democratic consolidation, and even though they are sharply different 
in terms of particularities of political systems, institutional frameworks, and cultural 
settings, they struggle with similar post-Soviet legacies that determine the specific 
character of their CMR. This thesis aims to contribute to the existing scholarship on 
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democratic civilian control and the process of consolidation in former communist 
countries. It provides insights for the development of optimal frameworks of democratic 
civilian control over the security sector, contributing to further analysis in terms of 
optimization of programs aimed at enhancing democratic consolidation in partner countries 
by and with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), 
or the United States. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review explores the scholarly debate on civil-military relations and 
democratic consolidation. It starts with an overview of the classical and more recent 
literature that sets essential boundaries of CMR in consolidated and consolidating 
democracies, as well as scholarly works addressing challenges of democratic consolidation 
in former Soviet states and contemporary security environments. 
1. Civil-Military Relations in Democracies 
A distinguished group of scholars argues that democratic civilian control over the 
armed forces ensures democratic stability. For Samuel P. Huntington, it is the so-called 
objective civilian control, which he equates to military professionalism that keeps the 
military away from politics.1 Huntington, however, does not provide a framework for 
achieving civilian control and relies on the necessity of acceptance of civilian supremacy 
by the professional military. Peter Feaver also recognizes the importance of civilian 
control, which he explains using the “principal-agency theory” originally developed by 
economists. Feaver applies this approach to CMR in an attempt to determine causal 
relationships embedded in bureaucratic politics or relations between different branches of 
power.2 Feaver argues that decisions and attitude of the military (the agent) significantly 
depend on anticipation of the punishment deriving from the failure to follow the orders 
issued by the civilian political authority (the principal). He illustrates his argument with a 
 
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985). 
2 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674036772. 
3 
situation where the principal expects the agent to be working while the latter is doing 
something else, thus shirking. At the same time, he stresses that civilians are always 
uncertain whether the military follows their orders only.3  
Overall, the “principal-agent” framework helps identify matters of civilian and 
military interaction influencing the quality of military subordination to civilian orders and 
measures the degree of ownership over the policymaking by the civilians while exercising 
their legitimate authority over the military. But these theories—which apply to 
consolidated democracies—do not help explain the challenges and opportunities for 
civilian control in developing democracies, since prospects of further consolidation are 
often undermined by the military due to the lack of acceptance of democratic values and 
practices, especially the ones related to democratic control of the security sector.  
Another group of scholars discusses the challenges to—and opportunities for—
achieving democratic civilian control in consolidating democracies. For example, Thomas 
Bruneau and Cristiana Matei posit that democratic civilian control over the security sector 
includes the following requirements: institutional control mechanisms (which include 
legislation, oversight instruments, and professional norms internalized in civilian-led 
security institutions); oversight (which involves formal organizations representing 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of power but most importantly the independent 
oversight by the media, civil society, and international organizations such as NATO or 
EU); and professional norms (which include transparent personnel policies about such 
concerns as recruitment, education, and training).4  Bruneau and Matei further stress that 
challenges to democratic civilian control include high military prerogatives and lack of 
civilian interest and expertise in defense and security issues.5  
 
3 Feaver, chap. 3. 
4 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military 
Relations (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013), 30, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203105276. 
5 Bruneau and Matei, 23–24. 
4 
These challenges lead to precarious or nonexistent reforms, as well as ineffective 
oversight by official authorities, civil society, or international organizations.6 Cristiana 
Matei and Carolyn Halladay agree with Bruneau and Matei and further stress that such 
difficulties, when not addressed properly, directly undermine the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of government institutions as well as subsequent oversight and control 
mechanisms, thus hampering further democratic progress.7 By highlighting an example of 
Indonesia where legislative oversight of the military simply does not exist, they underline 
significant factors of unformed or underdeveloped institutions that fail to ensure the needed 
quality of oversight and control over the security sector.8 What Matei and Halladay do not 
underscore are the high possibilities that in consolidating democracies increasing oversight 
and control may result in growing costs of its implementation in terms of investment of the 
scarce time, finances, and social capital, leading to compromises in terms of democratic 
consolidation.9 
Narcis Serra agrees with the challenges to achieving democratic civilian control 
identified by Bruneau, Matei, and Halladay.10 Serra identifies a set of measures aimed at 
overcoming these challenges, including reducing the military autonomy by gradually 
adapting the legislation, solidifying defense policymaking as one of the core functions of 
the civilian government, and building up effective institutional links between the armed 
forces, parliament, civil society, and the academic world.11 Overall, in light of the observed 
challenges in states falling under this category, these scholars conclude that the media 
 
6 Bruneau and Matei, 27–29. 
7 Florina Cristiana Matei and Carolyn Halladay, “The Control-Effectiveness Framework of Civil–
Military Relations,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, February 23, 2021, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1874. 
8 Matei and Halladay, 6. 
9 Matei and Halladay, 5–6. 
10 Narcís Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
11 Serra, 66–89. 
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along with international organizations and credible judicial infrastructure are necessary for 
successful democratic consolidation.12 
The reviewed literature defining the boundaries of CMR and realities of democratic 
transition and consolidation shows that the analytical focus and explanatory power of 
scholarly work have grown significantly since Huntington, as the security environment 
around the democratic world has evolved, especially since the end of the Cold War. 
Scholars mainly agree that democratic civilian control is the central aspect to be ensured 
and protected for consolidation into a solid democracy.  
2. Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in the Former Soviet States 
Recent studies reflect democratization and its accompanying realities in the former 
Soviet space, highlighting the significance of its positive outcomes for the countries that 
reported progress in democratic consolidation, while some have assessed the practical 
applicability of the aforementioned influential CMR theories by attempting to explain 
causal relationships determining the conditions for democratic progress or decline in 
former communist countries within the frames of the third wave of democratization.13  
One group of scholars argues that trending illiberal interests and “predatory” elites 
perceive democracy as a threat, and therefore create impediments to democratic progress 
without directly challenging democratic institutions acknowledged by society. Licia 
Cianetti, James Dawson, and Seán Hanley, for instance, provide analysis to multiple 
scholarly contributions addressing cases of democratic backsliding in such former 
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as Hungary, Poland, and the 
Baltic States.14 These scholars stress a decade-long trend observed in CEE states showing 
the concentration of excessive executive authority in hands of populist political groups 
 
12 Matei and Halladay, “The Control-Effectiveness Framework,” 11. 
13 Allison Elizabeth Dolby, “The Successes and Failures of Democracy in the Post-Soviet Republics” 
(Master’s thesis, Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/50533. 
14 Licia Cianetti, James Dawson, and Seán Hanley, “Rethinking ‘Democratic Backsliding’ in Central 
and Eastern Europe - Looking beyond Hungary and Poland,” East European Politics 34, no. 3 (2018): 243–
56, https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1491401. 
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powered by “conservative-nationalist” ideology, actively striving for non-liberal practices 
and gradually dismantling democratic control frameworks and institutional checks and 
balances.15 In addition, they underline the need to transform an established perception 
indicating that problems in democratic consolidation are to be attributed not to the Soviet 
legacies, corruption problems, or ineffective institutions, but rather primarily to a growing 
populist political agenda aimed at undermining the idea of democratic rule itself.16 
Furthermore, Cianetti reports on conditions of consolidation emphasizing the trade-offs 
regularly emerging between the elite interest to control resources as well as state 
institutions and the popular demand for a higher quality of democratization, eventually 
leading to a “stabilitocracy” rather than a consolidated democracy.17  
More precisely, however, Cianetti, referring to cases of Latvia and Estonia, posits 
that the democratic process in these countries has been limited in terms of political space 
to challenge mainstream socio-economic policies and the degree of political inclusion of 
ethnic minorities, which has translated into political stability at the expense of democratic 
quality and led to decreased transparency and accountability.18 Other scholars, like Anna 
Vachudova, mostly agree and strongly suggest that backsliding is attributed to the rise of 
ethno-populist parties actively striving to mobilize votes and consolidate political power 
through manipulation with neo-liberal economic policies and aggregation of the immigrant 
threat.19 However, Paweł Surowiec and Václav Štětka, referring to the same group of 
scholars, argue that the “illiberal turn” is a global trend rather than a regional one, which 
has emerged thanks to the gradual and effective exploitation of the media environment by 
the illiberal elites, for instance, by using advertising as a tool to practice political 
 
15 Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley, 245. 
16 Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley, 250. 
17 Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley, 251. 
18 Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley, 252. 
19 Milada Anna Vachudova, “Ethnopopulism and Democratic Backsliding in Central Europe,” East 
European Politics 36, no. 3 (July 2, 2020): 318–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1787163. 
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favoritism, distort the market, and streamline media to the government’s agenda through 
censorship and ownership of compliant media actors.20 
In response to growing concerns reflecting recent trends of democratic decline in 
the former Soviet bloc, a group of scholars discusses the possibility that acknowledged 
democratization of former communist states has not actually taken place. For example, 
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way stress the “myth of democratic recession” that has 
emerged due to false and exaggerated expectations and optimism relying on the temporary 
weakening of authoritarianism, and they point to the falsity of existing empirical data 
reflecting measurements of democratic progress in different states.21 They argue that in 
reality authoritarian weakening in post-Soviet states in the early 1990s is attributed to the 
severe socio-economic conditions or external vulnerabilities that emerged following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, temporarily diminishing possibilities for the political, 
economic, and military application of the authoritarian rule.22 Overall, Levitsky and Way 
underline that autocrats in the early 1990s learned ways to manipulate elections and 
suppress the media, private sector, or civic groups, without undermining the regime’s 
credibility at home or internationally. Moreover, the authors raise concerns that some cases 
classified as democratic progress toward consolidation never really stopped being non-
democratic; therefore, there is no democratic recession to measure whatsoever.23 
Examples of these states, in their view, include countries like Georgia, Ukraine, or 
Kyrgyzstan, showcasing that democratic control frameworks in these states represent 
mostly a facade, rather than a solid base for democratic consolidation.24  
 
20 Paweł Surowiec and Václav Štětka, “Introduction: Media and Illiberal Democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe,” East European Politics 36, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 1–8, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1692822. 
21 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Myth of Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26, 
no. 1 (January 7, 2015): 45–58, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0007. 
22 Levitsky and Way, 50. 
23 Levitsky and Way, 51. 
24 Levitsky and Way, 50. 
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Marc Plattner disagrees with conclusions drawn by Levitsky and Way. Also 
referring to analysis by Francis Fukuyama and Larry Diamond,25 Plattner argues that not 
all data that has measured democratic progress in the world can be disputed, neither can 
factors such as lack of good governance or poor rule of law be blamed solely as a driver 
for a democratic decline.26 Instead, Plattner strongly suggests that what is observed is the 
gradual stagnation of democratic prestige in the world generated by the socio-economic 
impact from global economic downturns impacting even advanced democracies. In 
addition, he underlines that the growing powerful authoritarian influence exercised by 
China, Russia, and others learning from them—for example, Iran and Saudi Arabia—often 
cooperate in ways that not only undermine democratic confidence but shift the geopolitical 
balance between democracies and their authoritarian adversaries.27  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
Based on the previous literature, I propose the following three hypotheses. First, I 
hypothesize that military “shirking”—as explained by Feaver—is one of the challenges to 
democratic civilian control in former Soviet countries. The armed forces’ refusal to carry 
out the missions assigned by the civilian authorities weakens democratic civilian control.28 
Second, I posit that continued military prerogatives—as explained by Serra, Bruneau, 
Matei, and Halladay—also challenge democratic civilian control, because the military 
remain the de facto defense and security decision makers, which in a democracy should be 
a civilian prerogative.29 Third, I hypothesize that lack of civilian expertise in defense and 
security matters or insufficient interest in military reforms, which—as emphasized by 
 
25 Larry Diamond, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 (2015): 
141–55, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0009; Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: 
From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy, First paperback edition. (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015). 
26 Marc F. Plattner, “Is Democracy in Decline?,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 (January 2015): 5–
10, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1353/jod.2015.0014. 
27 Plattner, 8–10. 
28 Feaver, Armed Servants, chap. 3. 
29 Bruneau and Matei, The Routledge Handbook, chap. 3; Matei and Halladay, “The Control-
Effectiveness Framework,” 5–6; Serra, The Military Transition, 66–69. 
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Bruneau, Matei, and Halladay—arrests defense reform and defense decision making 
progress.30  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN  
This work studies existing challenges to democratic civilian control of the security 
sector, standing in the way of successful democratic consolidation in Lithuania and 
Mongolia, and evaluates the correlation of those conditions with observed challenges to 
democratic civilian control in Georgia. The comparative case study method is applied to 
analyze and compare the degree of effectiveness of democratic civilian control frameworks 
over the security sector in Lithuania and Mongolia, by measuring the standard set of CMR 
policies and institutional frameworks acknowledged by scholars as necessary for 
successful democratic consolidation. The provided analysis is built upon the control-
effectiveness framework by Bruneau, Matei, and Halladay addressing institutional control 
mechanisms, inculcation of professional norms, and oversight by the legislative and 
judicial branches as well as civil society. 
The primary aim is to identify optimal solutions and facilitate effective policy 
development, executive decision making, and productive civil-society participation. The 
research seeks to reflect the needs of all post-communist societies striving for successful 
democratic consolidation. This thesis refers to such primary sources as national 
constitutions and legislation, governmental documents, national security concepts, military 
doctrines or development strategies, orders, and decrees, as well as the relevant foreign and 
security policy documents of Lithuania, Mongolia, and Georgia, including significant non-
governmental reviews and surveys. The research relies on existing theoretical frameworks 
responding to the modern requirements of understanding the nature of civil-military 
relations and its significance in terms of the successful democratic consolidation process, 
highlighting fresh views, and responding to contemporary security challenges. It addresses 
several historic and scholarly publications evaluating the status and conditions of 
 
30 Feaver, Armed Servants, chap. 3; Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of 
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15, no. 5 (2008): 909–929, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340802362505; “Matei and Halladay, 5–6. 
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democratic consolidation in the post-communist world since the Soviet collapse, existing 
dynamics, and the characteristics of the CMR in selected states. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE  
The thesis is comprised of four chapters. Chapter I has introduced the major 
research question, explained the significance of this research, and presented a literature 
review, as well as some explanations and hypotheses for answering the thesis question. 
Chapter II is a case study of Lithuania’s CMR, reflecting reforms, successes, and 
challenges to democratic civilian control. Chapter III is a case study of Mongolia reflecting 
reforms, successes, and challenges to democratic civilian control. Chapter IV provides the 
comparative analysis of Lithuania and Mongolia and evaluates their application to the 
research hypothesis. This chapter also provides a comparative summary based on the case 
study findings and includes a brief overview of the conditions for democratic civilian 
control in Georgia, reflecting the correlation of findings with CMR challenges in Lithuania 





II. THE CASE OF LITHUANIA 
This case study highlights the influence legacy post-Soviet tendencies exert on 
democratic civil-military relations in Lithuania and identifies essential impediments to the 
democratic CMR at different levels throughout security governance. The CMR in 
Lithuania has evolved based on Western anticipations of democratic control of the armed 
forces and aimed at excluding military intervention into politics. The effort to regain 
independence and achieve democratic transition occurred simultaneously. The CMR 
democratization backed by intensive Western advice and support led Lithuania to address 
principles of democratic civilian control through legislation, strategic documents, or 
military doctrine. But the post-Soviet legacy of political interference through institutional 
domination over security governance weakens democratic control and undermines the 
credibility of the State Defense Council (SDC), the minister of defense, or high-ranking 
military commanders. This trend obstructs the oversight by the parliament (the Seimas). 
While the judiciary is burdened by corruption, civil society at large lacks public support 
and the capacity to influence the security decision-making process in the country in a 
meaningful way. Insufficient and ineffective parliamentary oversight, a corrupt judiciary, 
and weak public scrutiny through media and non-governmental organizations (NGO) leave 
existing problems mostly unchecked. 
A. OVERVIEW OF CMR DEVELOPMENTS SINCE INDEPENDENCE AND 
THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
The 1992 constitution of Lithuania establishes a semi-presidential parliamentary 
republic as well as a clear legal basis for democratic control.31 The strategic intentions and 
priorities to which the president, government, and the Seimas agreed resulted in a 
Lithuanian civilian-led national command, a civilian defense ministry staffed mostly by 
civilians, and defense staff subordinated to the defense minister. Subsequently, in 
Lithuania, a clear civilian-led chain of command and military staff subordinated to the 
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ministry of national defense are implemented according to constitutionally legal terms in 
line with major Western conceptual imperatives. In post-independence Lithuania (since 
1991), the political elite and the society at large showed a strong desire for Western-style 
democratic reforms despite numerous political, socio-economic, and security challenges. 
Thus, the aspiration for democratic CMR was at the center of legal and structural reforms, 
which significantly contributed to Lithuania’s successful integration into NATO and the 
EU.  
1. CMR Developments after the Transition 
Between the two world wars in the 20th century, from 1918 to 1940, Lithuania 
enjoyed independence but was burdened with political instability, high military influence 
over politics, and officers striving for greater power and higher posts.32  In 1940, Russia 
forcibly established Soviet rule in Lithuania and put an end to national CMR, resulting in 
disbanded armed forces, many members of whom were executed, imprisoned, or exiled to 
Siberia’s concentration camps.33 The interwar illiberal traditions of military command and 
leadership have played little role in shaping CMR in post-Soviet Lithuania, despite some 
political effort to revive them.34  But the experience of Sovietization has generated a 
significant legacy that impedes the successful post-Soviet democratization of Lithuania.  
The period of Soviet rule introduced a repressive culture of centralized Communist 
Party control over security decision-making at all levels. As Thomas Durrell Young 
emphasizes, the Soviet approach in terms of military decision-making was antithetical to 
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the Western understanding of defense governance.35 The Soviets made decisions based on 
historical military data backing the rigorous scientific/algorithmic approach to military 
planning and execution. The whole approach was based on the experience of World War 
II, reflected in military doctrine, and any changes to it were decided at the highest political 
level and would apply to all the Soviet Union.36  After the Soviet collapse, Lithuania rebuilt 
its armed forces and other security services essentially from scratch, reforming the Soviet 
professional background and military infrastructure left over after the withdrawal of the 
Soviet military units, which were stationed on Lithuanian soil until late 1993.37 The 
withdrawal was slow and problematic; for instance, Lithuanian Air Force leadership openly 
criticized the government due to the insufficient response to violations of Lithuanian 
airspace by Russian military aircraft, a frequent event that aimed at further complicating 
the process.38 
In these realms, paramilitary formations such as the Voluntary Service of National 
Defense (VSND) and the Riflemen Union (Sauliu Sajunga) operated under very limited 
executive or parliamentary control. The scarcity of funding and narrow political interests 
caused regular conflicts between these formations and political or military leadership.39 
The VSND engaged in the two-month-long mutiny in 1993 and called for even greater 
autonomy from the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and demanded the removal of 
some civilian and military leaders from their posts. After long political debates and 
opposition, the new minister of defense Linas Linkevicius initiated a process that 
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reorganized the VSND into the National Defense Volunteer Forces (NDVF) and fully 
integrated it into the armed forces by 1998, marking the end of such disputes in Lithuanian 
CMR.40 
The transition to the market economy had triggered an economic and financial 
crisis, which left the security sector severely underfunded.41 The MND lacked funding for 
military uniforms, housing, or salaries.42 The newly formed Lithuanian army’s officer 
corps was comprised mostly of officers with Soviet education and volunteers organized 
under the mission of unconditional territorial defense. Despite the large initial presence of 
former Soviet officers in the Lithuanian military, the newly formed Lithuanian government 
believed that the Soviet-trained officers had inherited the problems of the Soviet military 
culture and could not serve as a model of honor, discipline, or integrity.43 
Consequently, enthusiastic civil servants inexperienced in defense governance, as 
well as officers with insufficient military backgrounds, organized the civilian defense 
leadership and management.44 Weak legal regulation of daily civil-military interaction in 
conditions of low funding and lack of civilian defense expertise often led to conflicting 
interpretations over who had the authority to decide on policy and who was responsible for 
implementing policy, triggering internal divisions and dissatisfaction within the defense 
organization.45 The civil-military interaction aimed more at gaining higher influence and 
power, rather than enhancing democratic defense governance. The defense leadership often 
neglected the military chain of command, directly interfering in the selection and 
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promotion of the military to ensure favorable appointments.46 Not surprisingly, essential 
military personnel decisions were made based on political considerations rather than on 
professionalism, and disputes between the high military command and civilian leadership 
have occurred regularly. In 1996, the government decided to integrate the MND and the 
defense staff under one structure. The integration initiative was driven politically, 
supposedly to exercise better control of the military decision-making, but even though this 
decision caused some initial frustration in the military, the outcome has proven to be 
positive as it helped normalize civil-military interaction and eliminated duplications and 
functional collisions between the military and civilian staff.47 
Furthermore, the MND developed procedural guidelines such as the Officer Career 
Concept and the Guidelines of the Minister of National Defense to regulate education and 
training, standard career requirements, and management principles in the armed forces.48 
In parallel, since 1994 the comprehensive upgrade of military training and education 
infrastructure has continued to be at the center of efforts since Lithuania joined the NATO 
Partnership for Peace program (PfP).49 NATO, the United States, the UK, France, and 
Germany have been actively supporting the education and professional development of 
Lithuanian defense civilians and the military staff, providing expert support and allocating 
slots in their respective educational institutions.50 This process solidified institutional 
democratic civilian control over the armed forces, subsequently improving the Lithuanian 
military’s public image by 2002.51 In parallel, however, controversies reflecting 
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problematic military procurement decisions have occasionally emerged in the media, 
contributing to the volatility of public support towards increased defense spending.52 
The Minister of Defense Juozas Oleka in 2007 declared the priority of creating an 
attractive organizational environment to motivate soldiers’ professionalism.53 In addition, 
mission command became the central principle in the first military doctrine adopted in 
2010, after a decade-long debate revealing limited conceptual comprehension of Western 
military doctrine.54 The doctrine defines mission command as the fundamental warfare 
principles that the Lithuanian armed forces follow, demanding creativity from service 
members capable of flexible, pragmatic, and decentralized implementation of a given task 
in line with the strategic intent under the single chain of command.55 These efforts have 
significantly enhanced democratic military culture in Lithuanian armed forces, which 
contributes to the organization of a civilian-led national chain of command. Consequently, 
the new Lithuanian armed forces evolved through the adoption of the legal framework that 
determines the democratic control of the military as an overarching principle for defense 
governance.56 
The constitutional-legal basis is centered on attributes developed mostly through 
the adoption of Huntington’s model of objective civilian control.57 The following key legal 
acts, developed with intensive international support and advice, incorporate essential 
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prerequisites for national security policy development and planning, executive control, and 
parliamentary oversight to ensure democratic civilian control of the security sector.58 
1. The Law on the Basics of National Security (1996) stipulates that the 
defense of Lithuania shall be total and unconditional. It envisages the 
development of defense and security institutions or capabilities in full 
compliance with principles of democratic control. The democratically 
elected civilian government is responsible for the development and 
implementation of policy for total defense and the civilian control of the 
armed forces. The government, the civilian minister of national defense, 
and the commander of the armed forces are accountable to the parliament 
(Seimas). The state security and defense institutions should implement 
defined by the government policies through the engagement of citizens, 
their associations, and organizations.59 
2. The Law on National Defense System Organization and Military Service 
(1998) defines detailed roles, duties, and responsibilities reflecting the 
Lithuanian strategic chain of command and clearly restricts military 
involvement in politics.60 The law prohibits service members from 
publicly disagreeing with official policies defined by the state, implying 
the public’s expectation that the military will maintain loyalty to the 
legitimate representatives of the state  a fundamental prerequisite for 
democratic CMR aimed at preventing military intervention in politics 
through, for instance, a coup d’état.  
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The constitution set the State Defense Council (SDC) as a key democratic 
mechanism for strategic political decision-making and governance of the security sector. 
The council is represented by the president (head of the council, and the supreme 
commander of the armed forces), the prime minister, the chairman of the Seimas, the 
minister of national defense, and the commander of the armed forces.61 The military 
defense strategy (2002–2004), the national security strategy (2002), and the Military 
Strategy (2012–2016) emphasize democratic civilian control as a fundamental principle for 
the Lithuanian defense and security decision-making. The SDC has approved these 
documents developed by the government, controls the implementation, and recommends 
changes when deemed necessary.62 
Notwithstanding the SDC’s constitutional role, it lacked institutional capacity to 
enhance consensus between its members. In 1999, political divisions rose between then-
President Valdas Adamkus and the rest of the political spectrum, including the cabinet and 
the minister of defense, over the candidacy of a new commander of the armed forces.63 
The lengthy political dispute finally was resolved as the president agreed to replace the 
nomination through compromise, only after receiving assurances that the initial nominee 
would be appointed as a deputy commander.64 The compromise favored a retired U.S. 
army colonel John Kronkaitis, who had returned to Lithuania to support the buildup of the 
armed forces in line with Western standards.65 In another instance, in 2005, the president 
initiated changes aimed at reshaping the constitutional arrangement of the SDC to 
transform it into the National Security Council (NSC), but was rejected by the government 
even before the submission to the Seimas. The NSC would include wider political 
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representation and authorize the commander of the armed forces to perform as a military 
adviser on solely military aspects of the security governance.66 
The Seimas has evolved as the principal body to oversee defense planning and 
spending.67  Also, the Seimas has exercised a formal responsibility to oversee other 
security agencies such as the ministry of the interior, which includes police and state border 
guards, State Security Department (SSD), and Special Investigation Service (SIS).68  The 
power to decide upon budgetary allocations has enabled parliamentary control over 
development and acquisition plans, or the overall defense resource management through 
activities of the National Security and Defense Committee of the Seimas (NSDC).69 
However, initially such authority could not be exercised by the NSDC effectively due to 
the lack of knowledge and expertise in defense matters.70 Thus, initiatives prepared by 
knowledgeable civilian defense officials were mostly approved by the Seimas without 
making any changes or critical analysis.71  Since then the Seimas has progressed in its 
capacity to work through all defense plans or security-related legislation, and the NSDC 
has occasionally been able to initiate state audits to verify the actual implementation of the 
defense budget.72 But, there has been limited development of practical tools that would 
ensure regular accountability by the government and control over the implementation of 
parliament’s decisions.73   
The independent judiciary has been essential for the government to exercise 
objective democratic control. For instance, the constitutional court has played a significant 
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role in terms of interpreting the constitution and has clarified issues affecting the 
democratic CMR balance in Lithuania, for example, the powers of the president as 
commander-in-chief and of the Seimas.74 Nonetheless, the core challenge of corruption 
has persisted at the lower-level courts in the Lithuanian judiciary, and the issue of judicial 
independence is a matter of concern, especially since 2006 when allegations arose of 
political bias by the council of judges over the selection or the performance of judges.75 
The anti-corruption service of Lithuania continues to investigate and prosecute corrupt 
judges and their affiliates.76 The negative effects of corruption and mismanagement in 
Lithuanian courts have encouraged non-compliance and a non-enforcement culture within 
state institutions and led to high corruption risks and military procurement scandals.77 
Productive informal oversight conducted by vibrant civic groups and media could 
notably mitigate the gap created by the judiciary and encourage the de-politicization and 
objectivity of the security governance. Indeed, civil society in Lithuania developed as free 
and independent, supported by Western civic groups and organizations; however, it 
struggled to play an active role and contribute to the productive oversight of defense and 
security governance.78 The persisting civic passivity by the Lithuanian society has been a 
core challenge for civil society, which can be attributed to the legacy mentality of informal 
engagement with the government and mistrust towards mass civic movements or 
associations. Public focus on the armed forces and its civilian decision-makers was 
sharpened mostly by the cases of mismanagement or disciplinary issues occasionally 
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emerging in the newspapers, while public interest and support over the development of the 
armed forces and its capabilities have remained notably low by rating the military below 
mass media, the president, and the church.79 
The media has played a minimal role to compensate for the negative legacy trend 
in public disinterest in defense matters.80 The MND initiated a line of publications 
addressing matters of national defense and promoting the activities of Lithuanian military 
culture. Thus, the MND actively, but with limited success, strived to build effective social 
interaction formats between the wider public and the military.81 Yet, the persuasive power 
of publications has remained low, and the attention of the Lithuanian public has been more 
drawn to smaller incidents, rather than to military exercises or their performance, which 
can be attributed to the lack of military expertise by the media and its overall professional 
immaturity.82  
2. The Executive and CMR 
Security institutions in Lithuania, including the armed forces, operate under legacy 
conditions of institutional domination by the presidents and politically biased strategic 
decision-making at the national command level.83 The president as the supreme 
commander of the Lithuanian armed forces exercises a joint authority of command over 
the security sector together with the government through the SDC. The president appoints 
the commander of the armed forces, which the Seimas must approve, and the land forces 
commander, which the defense minister must approve; the president also decides, based on 
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the minister’s suggestion, the promotions to the highest military ranks.84 The defense 
policy implementation, including international defense cooperation, is the ultimate 
responsibility of the defense minister.85 The joint executive authority between the 
president and the minister of defense hinders effective strategic decision-making and 
triggers diverging interpretations of these authorities or the needed decisions. The 
politicization of the decision-making process limits the effective utilization of military 
education and training received through existing educational capacity and Western support 
to develop rational policies.86  
Presidents with strong charisma and decisiveness can take solid initiative, 
overcome political resistance, and change the course of the defense and security agenda in 
the country to capitalize on the emerging crisis, while the constitutional authority of the 
SDC lacks actual power to prevent the politicization of the national security decision-
making process. Deividas Šlekys observes that presidential influence rose to its highest 
point in 2014 as President Dalia Grybauskaitė, while responding to the Crimean crisis, 
made a surprise political move and announced the intention to reinstate conscription 
abolished in 2008 for the sake of professionalization and optimization of defense 
spending.87 Consequently, the minister’s institutional credibility was significantly 
undermined and neglected by the president through her announced intentions regarding the 
reintroduction of conscription based on the advice of the chief of defense, whom she 
consulted directly. The defense minister responded to the apparent isolation by publicly 
expressing skepticism over the matter, even though he formally agreed to the decision of 
the SDC initiated by the president.88 
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The SDC, as the principal body formed to support the president as the supreme 
commander of the armed forces, enhances the inter-agency coordination on security.89 The 
SDC approves strategic documents, or initiates necessary changes to them, and is 
responsible for generating sound defense and security recommendations and submitting 
them to the Seimas for approval.90 The constitutional-legal framework tasks the SDC with 
formal responsibility to ensure consensus building and effective strategic security decision-
making, involving all major actors eligible to determine the country’s security agenda. The 
commander of the armed forces, as a member of the SDC, participates in security decision-
making and contributes to domestic and foreign policy development. Furthermore, the SDC 
is responsible for coordinating activities between the SSD and the military intelligence 
services belonging to the MND.91  
Nevertheless, the SDC, as the consensus-building mechanism, has lacked the actual 
capacity to prevent unilateral political actions by the president despite its traditional 
effectiveness in terms of decision-making or political influence. Also, SDC activity 
decreased from 2005 through 2013, due to a diminished focus on defense and security 
matters shortly after the integration into the alliance was achieved.92 As Nortautas Statkus 
highlights, despite the SDC being the highest political body formed to make strategic 
decisions, it lacks administrative resources to make such decisions and oversee their 
implementation regularly.93 Moreover, as Tapio Raunio and Thomas Sedelius observe, the 
established political culture in Lithuania favors “strong leadership and presidential 
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activism,” meaning that popular presidents do not require any coordination bodies such as 
the SDC to exert their influence.94 
The civilian defense minister leads the organization and management of the 
national defense system (NDS), consisting of the MND, the commander of the armed 
forces and the defense staff, the armed forces, education and training institutions, defense 
infrastructure, or the state enterprises established by the MND. In times of war, the border 
police, special police force, and organized civilian resistance groups are subordinated to 
the MND.95 Yet the potential for political polarization at the national command level 
generates spillover effects at the lower levels of civil-military interaction between the 
minister of defense and the highest military commanders. This observation reflects 
situations when relatively lower-level commanders bypass superiors, such as the 
commander of the armed forces, to arrange meetings with the defense minister or the 
president while seeking higher political leverage.96 As Tony Lawrence and Tomas 
Jermalavičius observe, inconsistencies in the competencies of the military command have 
regularly turned into division over command-and-control issues between the commander 
of the armed forces and the rest of the high military command. Furthermore, when the 
relationship between the minister and the commander of the armed forces becomes tense, 
the minister often tends to interact with lower-level commanders and chiefs directly.97   
In addition, the director-general for capability and armaments in MND has led the 
process of strategic planning since 2009.98 As the director-general took over the process 
of strategic planning, however, the commander of the armed forces was left without the 
direct organizational capacity to perform effectively, and thus to advise the minister on the 
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same strategic matters of planning or defense resource management.99 On the other hand, 
despite the important role the director-general plays to ensure effective and efficient 
management of the defense organization, the director-general faces complicated 
interactions derived from the position’s subordination to the minister while being 
accountable to military leadership, which can further hinder credible decision-making and 
effective democratic control.100 
At the same time, the threat of corruption remains mostly unmitigated due to the 
underdeveloped or unutilized mechanisms of internal control. The inspector general in 
MND is responsible for building integrity in defense, including the effective response to 
whistleblowers.101 The Code of Ethics for Lithuanian soldiers, adopted by the defense 
minister’s order since 2005, defines the main requirements for ethical conduct, which are 
the “respect for the man and the state, patriotism, and citizenship, political neutrality, 
justice, legitimacy, responsibility, subordination, confidentiality, honesty, mutual trust, 
selflessness, impartiality, exemplariness.”102 Nevertheless, the Lithuanian chapter of 
Transparency International (TI) reports that the anti-corruption system in Lithuanian 
defense is perceived through a purely institutional prism, leading to merely a mechanical 
application of legal provisions and detailed rules, which can be bypassed by those 
interested, while uncorrupt individuals are posed to comply to detailed restrictions, 
especially in security institutions.103 These difficulties are further burdened by the lack of 
effective tools for whistleblower protection, obsession with legal assurances and control, 
along with the legacy culture of non-cooperation. Furthermore, although overall anti-
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corruption plans are being implemented, more must be done to introduce anti-corruption 
training of the military and civilian staff tailored to organizational needs, especially for 
those responsible for the management of procurement and personnel.104  
The officer career concept (2012) has updated the career framework and defines 
detailed steps for career development based on consideration of officers’ characteristics, 
skills, and potential. Individual potential must be assessed objectively by higher command, 
aiming at harmonization of individual needs and aspirations with the necessities of the 
Lithuanian defense.105  Also, The Guidelines of the Minister of National Defense 
(2012−2017) prioritize improvements in terms of officer career planning and organization 
to enable better utilization of the individual service member’s potential and skills. These 
guidelines also emphasize the need for increased effort to upgrade administrative, 
management, and communication skills among higher military ranks and their role in the 
career planning of their subordinates.106  Notwithstanding the mentioned effort to address 
career management needs and priorities, Romas Prakapas’s analysis shows that Lithuanian 
officers lack initiative and faith in the selection process and position assignment due to low 
transparency, even though formal procedures for individual career development and 
planning are in place. Furthermore, Prakapas reports that almost a third of respondents 
complained of being evaluated subjectively and that the assessment method is 
problematic.107 Despite the mentioned efforts and capacity building, the actual service 
environment in the military units is unsupportive of active learning and sufficient transfer 
of knowledge, which are essential for universalization of democratic norms and values 
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throughout the command authority at all levels.108 The space for the practical realization 
of gained knowledge or developed skills is limited due to the restrictive legacy service 
environment and underestimation of the importance of continuous professional 
development by the military.109 
Institutional rather than cultural focus on mission command hinders cultural 
adaptation through military education and training that would further advance the 
inculcation of democratic professional norms and values in the Lithuanian military. Recent 
research focused on the evaluation system for factors affecting creativity in the Lithuanian 
armed forces shows that the comprehensive process of analysis, assessment, and response 
to conditions encouraging creativity in Lithuanian armed forces is yet to be introduced.110 
Furthermore, Gražina Miniotaite reports flawed anticipation of democratic ways of 
management in the armed forces. Almost half of the respondents considered that 
democracy in the army is incompatible with the requirements of discipline and compliance, 
despite the number of norms regulating complaints or the reporting to higher levels, 
reflecting the mixture of modern and postmodern cultures and the post-Soviet legacy 
mentality in the Lithuanian military.111 Miniotaite refers to the survey conducted by the 
Lithuanian Military Academy in 2009, revealing that despite the overall positive image of 
the Lithuanian military and disapproval of negative stereotypes about the military service, 
almost a third of respondents cited the factor of persisting corruption in the armed forces, 
powered by legacy bureaucracy and culture of secrecy.112  
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In addition, as observed by the Šlekys, a restrictive culture persists in the Lithuanian 
armed forces, preventing meaningful intellectual reflection on issues such as strategic 
aspects of war, defense policies, or underlying threats to national security, causing gaps in 
continuous improvement of military professionalism.113 Šlekys emphasizes that excessive 
institutional focus on democratic reforms has neglected traditions of intellectual reflection, 
taken for granted in Western societies since the evolution of CMR frameworks took place 
through an already established institutional basis for military professionalism.114 The 
intellectually restrictive character of civil-military interaction within the Lithuanian 
defense system affects the transfer of knowledge between service members and impedes 
the knowledge retention process in the Lithuanian military. Such transfer can be critical for 
unhindered internalization of democratic professional norms in the military culture, 
especially in conditions of high personnel turnover.115  At the same time, limited internal 
professional discussions with the military staff through the chain of command includes 
insufficient communication of new norms and regulations as well as a limited response to 
the concerns of service members while demanding unconditional loyalty to the issued 
policies.116 
3. The Legislature and CMR 
The Seimas approves overall organizational structure, size, and number and 
category of ranks for the armed forces and the NDVF.117 Since 2012, the law on 
intelligence stipulates that the SSD and the second investigation department are both 
accountable to the NSDC. With this amendment, the committee is authorized to receive 
reports or written explanations from the intelligence services and reflect deficiencies or act 
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in the prevention of violations. The NSDC exercises parliamentary scrutiny by organizing 
hearings, requesting governmental information, issuing audit reports, and initiating ad-hoc 
control or investigation commissions. Constitutionally the structure, internal rules, and 
procedures of the Seimas are defined by its statute, which also defines the role and 
responsibilities of the NSDC and other committees such as the committee on budget and 
finance and the audit.118 These committees are the essential instruments enabling the 
Seimas to oversee and control defense spending. Committees including the NSDC are 
configured based on the principle of proportional representation, considering the rights of 
the political minorities and the overall number of parliament members.119 The NSDC has 
the responsibility to decide upon initiatives reflecting matters of national security and 
defense, issue proposals, and make recommendations on defense policy development and 
improvements needed for its implementation. Besides, the ministry of finance reviews all 
defense expenditure plans, while parliamentary hearings on defense budget are open and 
information reflecting the planned spending is made available to the public.120  
Still, the NSDC lacks the legal power to initiate inspections or audits in these 
institutions.121 Therefore, the SSD and the second investigation department, which reports 
directly to the minister of defense, both mostly operate without any direct parliamentary 
oversight or engagement.122 Moreover, due to the weak procedural regulation on the 
matter, the Seimas lacks the institutional power to acquire secret information from security 
services, considering that such requests can be ignored by security institutionseven the 
MNDwithout facing any politically meaningful penalty.123 Further, defense 
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procurement is often conducted through single-sourcing or secret procedures, while the 
procurement oversight mechanisms are insufficient to effectively scrutinize the process.124  
Despite close to exemplary legislation, the balance between secrecy and 
accountability has proven to be challenging for the Seimas to exercise effective oversight; 
thus, it often struggles to deliver practical results. Lawyers Edita Ziobiene and Gintaras 
Kalinauskas raise concerns that the number of parliamentary interpellations that were 
ignored by ministers has been growing and provide analytical evidence reflecting 
deficiencies in the statutory procedures and regulations of the Seimas and subsequent 
committees.125 These scholars argue that several significant legislative-organizational 
factors hinder the very effectiveness of parliamentary oversight, such as the Statute of the 
Seimas. The latter lacks procedural clarity for parliamentary oversight, specific rules 
demanding proper responsiveness from the cabinet members and their attendance to 
committee deliberations, or provision of requested information while facing formal 
consequences if they fail to comply with the demands of the Seimas.126 Ziobiene and 
Kalinauskas posit that investigations initiated by the NSDC can merely trigger political 
debate, but they lack the true capacity to conduct productive scrutiny when it comes to 
defense and security institutions, and therefore, oversight is rarely exercised effectively.127 
For example, parliamentary interpellation initiated by the NSDC requesting analytical 
reports in 2006, following the investigation focused on the SSD’s undertakings, was 
essentially ignored.128 Overall, mechanisms to enforce effective oversight over the 
security sector by the Seimas remain underdeveloped or unutilized. 
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4. Judicial Review  
The constitutional court has acted in favor of the democratic CMR balance in the 
country. Nonetheless, a lack of transparency and accountability of the judicial 
establishment, especially at lower levels of judicial practice, generates high risks of 
corruption and is often exploited by narrow political or business interests. The low 
performance of the judiciary and constantly stagnating public trust and confidence were 
not left unquestioned and were followed by constant public criticism. The administration 
of Lithuanian courts has responded to the public criticism of the judicial practice by 
introducing more rigorous public communication policies, followed by an effort to apply 
technological solutions aimed at improving the transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency 
of courts.129  
The problem of independence and impartiality has been addressed by the 
international NGO Transparency International (TI), which assessed conditions in the 
Lithuanian judiciary in 2016. The TI report emphasized critical vulnerabilities in terms of 
corruption risks at all levels while recognizing that the rate of bribery in the judiciary is 
lower than in other institutions.130 Also, several high-ranking judges have continued 
informal engagements with businessmen after their cases were settled in the court of 
appeals, while the council of judges applied no disciplinary measures in response to the 
unethical conduct.131 Such conditions generate a sense of mistrust in Lithuanian society at 
large including within the military towards the judiciary, encouraging informal ways of 
problem-solving and uncertainty in terms of the legal protection of individual rights or the 
fair treatment by the superiors.132 
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5. Informal Oversight  
Transparency International reports that the legal framework enabling access to 
public information is well implemented and shows a high response rate. Since 2013 the 
government has allowed the growth of civil-society actors by enabling citizens to divert 
their taxes and fund preferred NGOs, added by legislative initiatives and strategic 
documents strongly emphasizing the important public role of the civic sector.133 The 
Western support aimed at civil-society capacity development as well as the government’s 
efforts to support its effectiveness, however, are insufficient to neutralize the persisting 
civic passivity of Lithuanian society. The legal framework for the protection of 
whistleblowers remains weak, generating skepticism over possible repercussions for 
revealing problems.134 Although the Seimas approves the budget for the Media Support 
Fund,135 the current media environment in Lithuania is highly competitive and constantly 
faces a lack of economic adaptability in the conditions of a liberal economy, translating 
into excessive commercialization, notable socio-political polarization, and low media 
quality.136 The military has complained that the media have been reluctant to deal with 
military issues and that defense matters are often side-lined.137 
B. ANALYSIS 
The following analysis is built on the control-effectiveness framework and 
requirements developed by Bruneau, Matei, and Halladay addressing institutional control 
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mechanisms, inculcation of professional norms, and oversight by the legislative and 
judicial branches as well as civil society. Relevant values ranging from “low” to “high” for 
each requirement are assigned to None, Inconsistent, and Full application of the 
requirements for democratic control in practice. A summary of findings is presented in 
Table 1.  





Value Medium Low Medium 
 
1. Requirements for Institutional Control Mechanisms 
Lithuania scores medium in the Institutional Control Mechanisms category. In line 
with NATO requirements, civilian authorities lead the national chain of command of the 
Lithuanian armed forces. The commander of the armed forces is subordinated to the 
minister of defense within clearly defined roles and responsibilities and participates in 
strategic security decision-making as a member of the SDC. The quality of military 
subordination to civilian orders eliminates risks of military intervention into politics. The 
military career management framework is based on the principle of individual career 
planning and development. Officers can follow a career goal communicated through higher 
command. Nevertheless, the institutional capacity of the SDC is insufficient and often 
results in declining coordination and lack of responsiveness to the national or collective 
security challenges. Such challenges are to be responded to with strategic decisions aimed 
at strengthening social resilience, optimal application of total defense policy, and effective 
strategic communication with the Lithuanian public.138 
Security institutions in Lithuania, including the armed forces, operate under legacy 
conditions of institutional domination by popular presidents and politically biased strategic 
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decision-making at the national command level.139 The post-Soviet legacy expressed in 
political domination and interference in institutional autonomy has regularly undermined 
the credibility of the defense minister, top military commanders, and their relationships. 
These conditions, despite the constitutional-legal framework imitating the Western 
perception of democratic CMR, strongly enhance the restrictive culture of leadership and 
management at organizational levels, arresting objective policy development and credible 
internal control.140 TI’s reports since 2012 reflect no significant change in the anti-
corruption area. Lithuania has been placed in the band C (moderate corruption risk) since 
2015, while the inspector general in MND has been acknowledged as ineffective and non-
transparent by the NGO.141  
2. Requirements for Oversight  
In the Requirements for Oversight category, Lithuania ranks low. The quality of 
democratic civilian control, organization of parliamentary oversight, and control as defined 
by the constitution and subsequent legislation depends more on the political leverage of 
political actors and the willingness of the government rather than on institutional checks 
and balances. The weak institutional capacity of the Seimas creates possibilities for high-
profile political controversies involving top political leaders who pursue their political 
agendas through institutional domination, while security institutions operate under formal 
but ineffective parliamentary oversight.  
Consequently, the Seimas has mostly served as the arena for political rivalry and 
populist debates, driven by further consolidation of executive power and control. Such a 
trend was specially empowered by popular presidents; thus, parliamentary oversight of the 
security sector is politically weak and mostly ineffective.142 The judiciary provides fair 
guarantees for democratic CMR balance in the country at the constitutional level; however, 
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at lower levels of interaction democratic civilian control is unsupported by credible and 
effective judicial oversight. Meanwhile, the civil society and media in Lithuania lack 
essential power and credibility to deliver meaningful results and exercise informal 
oversight over the decision-making in security institutions and respond to existing 
inconsistencies or demand improvements productively. 
3. Requirements for Professional Norms 
In the category of Requirements for Professional Norms Lithuania ranks medium. 
Lithuanian civilian and military leadership and staff have been given numerous 
opportunities at all levels to familiarize themselves with Western democratic norms, 
values, and practices.143 Overall, the consolidated domestic and international effort has led 
to the development of necessary education and professional development capacity, built 
upon the concepts of Western military education that strongly enhances inculcation of 
democratic norms and values among the civilian and military staffs. By contrast, the 
politicization of the decision-making process at institutional and organizational levels 
hinders the effective utilization of military education and training received since regaining 
independence through Western support. As Romas Prakapas’s analysis shows, Lithuanian 
officers lack initiative and faith in the selection process. Therefore, despite the number of 
norms regulating complaints or the reporting to higher levels, the mixture of modern and 
postmodern military culture supplemented by the post-Soviet legacy mentality of informal 
dealings has persisted in the Lithuanian military.144  
C. CONCLUSION 
Lithuania’s successful democratic transition since 1991 shows that CMR reforms 
in post-Soviet legacy conditions can be fully implemented only through comprehensive 
consideration of critical legacy impediments. These impediments reflecting the 
politicization of the security governance hinder full implementation of Western models of 
 
143 Vaidotas Urbelis, “Defence Policies of the Baltic States: From the Concept of Neutrality towards 
NATO Membership,” NATO-EAPC Individual Fellowship Report (Vilnius, Lithuania: NATO, 2003), 11–
12, https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/vaidotas.pdf. 
144 Miniotaite, Democratic Civil-Military Relations, 182–83. 
36 
leadership, command, and management that enable liberal normative frameworks and 
credible foundations for democratic civilian control and military professionalism.145 Such 
efforts, being antithetical to the Soviet legacies, have required cultural changes to 
decentralize leadership and management under credible internal control and public 
oversight. The Lithuanian reformers and Western advisors underestimated the scale and 
complexity of necessary cultural adjustments given the legacy mentality of large portions 
of Lithuanian society.146 At the same time, the anti-corruption system in Lithuanian 
defense requires a robust civilian-military chain of command, high professionalism, and 
commitment to the public service to ensure transparency and accountability in 
management, be it in procurement, personnel, or finances. Without such a functioning 
system, potential corruption and the depletion of resources could lead to scandals that 
severely damage the image and overall legitimacy of the defense establishment.147 
Lithuania’s defense and security have been under increased public attention and 
scrutiny since the Russian intervention in Crimea in 2014. This intervention served as a 
major wake-up call for Lithuanian society, considering its relaxed security stance after 
Lithuania’s accession to NATO and the EU.148  Defense and security matters have 
subsequently gained higher attention from the Lithuanian public and political elite, 
enabling a substantial rise in defense spending and political commitments for essential 
defense reforms. This trend offers new opportunities to reevaluate CMR challenges and 
improve upon the inconsistencies that hinder democratic civilian control in Lithuania.149  
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III. THE CASE OF MONGOLIA  
This case study reflects the post-Soviet political, institutional, and cultural legacies 
that generate essential impediments to effective and efficient security governance and 
democratic CMR in Mongolia. The Mongolian armed forces and other security institutions 
operate in legacy conditions of frequent politicization practiced through single-party 
domination over the legislative and executive branches. Such a trend generates a permanent 
need to utilize institutional authority for the consolidation of political power. The president 
addresses the need for higher power or authority by dominating the NSC, while the 
parliament deals with political corruption through the highly politicized and corrupt 
judiciary. The prime minister manages the government, remaining mostly unchecked by 
the parliament, the judiciary, and the democracy-oriented civil society that lacks the 
essential capacity to overcome barriers and exercise effective public scrutiny. 
A. OVERVIEW OF CMR DEVELOPMENTS SINCE INDEPENDENCE AND 
THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
CMR in Mongolia has undergone a post-Soviet transition aimed at the protection 
of its national security interests through active international engagement and contribution 
to the global peacekeeping effort. These interests derive from Mongolia’s historic 
conditions of being landlocked between two authoritarian regimes of China and Russia. 
Therefore, democratic progress has been achieved through balancing the relationships with 
neighbors and the delicate implementation of the diplomatic “Third Neighbor” policy. 
With this policy, Mongolia has actively striven for bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
with the Western democratic world in the political, economic, defense, cultural, and 
humanitarian spheres.150 Consequently, Mongolia has achieved considerable progress 
while reforming its armed forces and reshaping its Soviet legacy social interaction at the 
operational and tactical levels. In this process, civilian and military security perceptions 
have been harmonized around the central role of peacekeeping, and therefore, the 
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introduced reforms have not faced any notable backlash from the militaries’ part, enhanced 
by the communist past of subordination to civilian-political orders.151 
1. CMR Developments after the Transition 
Historically, Mongolian military traditions have evolved dynamically since the 
13th century. The Mongol empire employed more than a million armed men to ensure 
Mongolia’s military dominance over world trade and politics right until its gradual 
disintegration in the 14th century and eventual domination over Mongolia by the Manchu 
Qing Dynasty in the 16th century.152 In this period of historic evolution, early Mongolian 
military culture has been formed through a firm and innovative application of centralized 
control and decentralized operational-tactical command of the military forces.153 This 
approach positioned Mongolian soldiers and commanders as engaging a life-long military 
service through a “life of arms” as opposed to a “profession of arms,” performed under 
strict requirements of loyalty to the Khan, and included constant training, preparation, and 
commitment to advance the Mongol imperial interests.154  
The individualistic character of the nomadic warrior was incorporated into the 
culture of discipline and unity of effort, closely resembling modern Western anticipations 
of command and control. Command relationships were managed in line with administrative 
regulations reflecting matters of individual, decentralized resource management, and 
performance.155 At the same time, a merit-based personnel selection system operated in 
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the Khan’s army to support the high demand for discipline and individual as well as unified 
combat readiness. Leaders, fighters, and specialists were selected and assigned to their 
duties based on the assurances of loyalty, high potential, and trust. Such a system produced 
soldiers with a high degree of professionalism, who increased their proficiency and gained 
experience through continuous and demanding military campaigns.156 
The modern Mongolian army was established in 1921 and fought along with the 
Red Army against rebels, Japanese and Chinese units on different occasions. When the 
Soviet socialist revolution reached its culmination, the Russian Red Army pressed forward 
to neutralize all counter-revolutionary threats posed by the White Army, including those 
remaining in Mongoliaa development actively supported by Mongolian society as it 
moved through a narrow path of survival to its national sovereignty and independence.157 
During Soviet times, similarly as in Lithuania, the Mongolian security sector was fully 
integrated into the Soviet security apparatus, operating under centralized Communist Party 
control. In contrast to their Lithuanian counterparts, the Mongolian officers could hold high 
posts while managing the armed forces; however, such management was conducted under 
strict centralized Soviet planning and supervision.158 Under Communist Party rule, 
remarkable historic military traditions based on loyalty, high morale, and credible 
leadership underwent forceful ideological and intellectual oppression into the coercive 
culture of unconditional subordination. The longstanding political control by the 
Communist Party and its management resulted in military obedience achieved under the 
systemic and unrestricted threat of intimidation.  
As Soviet pressure gradually decreased by 1989, anti-communist sentiments grew 
and Mongolian intellectuals pushed for intensified political and socio-economic 
discussions that evolved into pro-democracy demonstrations, eventually ending with the 
political agreement to hold the first multiparty elections in Mongolia. At the same time, 
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public skepticism powered by the absence of an external military threat after the Soviet 
Union’s collapse and growing socio-economic turmoil in the country undermined funding 
and political support for the development of the armed forces.159 In the early post-Soviet 
transition, considering a past marked by centralized Communist Party control enforced by 
the secret police and ideological indoctrination, the Mongolian military lacked credibility 
and public support. Therefore, already by the early 1990s, the culture of direct political 
party control over the military represented the major post-communist legacy hindering the 
democratization of civil-military relations in Mongolia.  
The ministry of defense has struggled with a lack of professionalism and defense 
expertise in civilian staff who have suffered from low salaries and status, relative to the 
active or former military who served in the defense organization.160 The average rate of 
leadership change in the ministry of defense, which has taken place once every two years 
since 1996, has left ministers without the effective institutional capacity or the political 
authority to perform their duties.161 The armed forces have also been underfunded, and 
thus conscription, as well as military service and careers in general, have been perceived 
as something to be avoided, further degrading the effectiveness of the armed forces.162 
Nevertheless, the adoption of the constitution ended debates over the existence of the 
armed forces and introduced democratic civilian control with a central focus on territorial 
defense. Formal duties and responsibilities at the level of national command have been 
clearly defined and civilian supremacy has been adopted as the central principle of security 
governance in Mongolia. In line with the traditional national approach, the state security 
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imperatives form the foundation for subsequent domestic and foreign policies or strategies 
aimed at the good performance of Mongolia both at home and internationally.163  
At the same time, the lack of needed equipment, necessary language skills, legacy 
military education, and training have challenged the peacekeeping reorientation of the 
Mongolian military, while some officers have perceived peacekeeping as detrimental to 
military readiness.164 Bruneau and Matei posit that at the beginning of defense reforms, 
the peacekeeping concept got rejected since both politicians and the military had no 
essential knowledge of modern peacekeeping needs and military professional 
requirements.165 Still, military advice and support provided by the United States, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, and Japan have 
reversed Mongolian political and military perceptions regarding peacekeeping.166 Access 
to professional military education and training provided by the United States has further 
expanded the understanding of modern requirements for democratic CMR, multinational 
missions, or peacekeeping operations. Since then, the Mongolian armed forces have 
contributed to missions in Iraq, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, South Sudan, Chad, and 
Afghanistan.167  
The peacekeeping role and the international humanitarian support have become the 
central peacetime duties for Mongolian armed forces. Principles of political neutrality and 
subordination to the civilian orders are emphasized in relevant legal acts and regulations, 
aimed at further improvement in professional, psychological, and physical readiness 
required for multi-national deployments and higher compatibility with Western armed 
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forces.168 Subsequently, the complementarity of civil-military anticipations regarding the 
future development of the armed forces, despite its core mission of territorial defense, has 
largely revolved around the goal of strengthening the peacekeeping credibility and 
international image of Mongolia.169  
As the result, the Western concept of military professionalism has been introduced 
without any notable resistance or tension from the military side.170 The “Fundamentals of 
the State Military Policy” (1998), subsequent government action-plans, and other policy 
documents have defined peacekeeping as an integral part of the declared defense policy.171 
The legal framework regulating defense matters and subsequent mechanisms for the 
democratic civilian control over the armed forces were developed to ensure rapid 
adaptation to the contemporary security needs and challenges while considering historic 
political and socio-economic conditions in Mongolia. The following legal acts shape the 
democratic CMR framework in Mongolia: 
1. The Law on Civil-Military Service Duties and Legal Status of Military 
Personnel, the law on ensuring the National Security of Mongolia, and the 
Law on the National Security Council of Mongolia were adopted in 1992, 
along with the Law on Defense of Mongolia (1993), and Law on Pensions 
and Benefits for Military personnel (1994).172 
2. The first legal document reflecting the Basis of the State Military Policy, 
the Law on the State of War, and the Law on Mobilization was approved 
by the parliament in 1998, followed by the Law on Armed Forces (2002), 
the Law on the Legal Status of the Ministry and Law on Government 
Agencies (2004) that defines administrative responsibilities and roles of 
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the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of Armed Forces. Legal acts 
adopted in 1998, such as the Law on the State of Emergency, Law on the 
State of War, and Law on War authorize the NSC to take over the full 
control of the state capacity in times of state emergency or war, if 
approved by the parliament.173 
3. The Defense Law of Mongolia initiated by the president in 2016 prohibits 
the employment of the military against the interests of the state and 
Mongolian society at large. The same year parliament expanded the roles 
of the armed forces by adopting an armed forces law. This law is set to 
regulate Mongolian armed forces’ involvement in the management of the 
strategically valuable copper mines and the prevention of conflicts 
between representatives of large groups of foreign labor performing in 
Mongolian mines. Also, the law regulates the role of the armed forces in 
contributing to the build-up of major state infrastructure without affecting 
the quality of Mongolia’s self-defense.174  
4. The law on the legal status of military personnel and the Law on Military 
Service defines the categories of officers, NCOs, conscript, professional, 
and alternative military service personnel as the active duty, as well as the 
mobilization reserve, while professional forces represent a central capacity 
for the self-defense of Mongolia.175 
These legal acts also address matters of defense organization and management, 
military service and training, mobilization, military rank system, etc., determined to ensure 
the protection of the Mongolian state, its sovereignty, and territorial integrity, while all 
state institutions are legally bound to participate in the safeguarding of state.176 The 
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parliament has updated the Basis of Defense Policy of Mongolia in 2015, and adopted 
subsequent legal amendments in the mentioned acts, including the new Defense Law of 
Mongolia initiated by the president. Introduced amendments responded to the urgent needs 
of defense optimization in line with contemporary and global technological, informational, 
security, and economic threats or tendencies.177 Amendments to the Law on Military 
Service and the Law on Legal Status of Military Personnel, made in 2016, define a mixed 
system of conscription, professional force, and alternative service. Furthermore, the law 
has clarified that military ranks can be assigned only by military organizations and further 
emphasizes principles of political neutrality and military subordination.178  
The constitution sets the president as the commander-in-chief, who leads the 
government in matters of defense and security through the NSC.179 The NSC includes the 
prime minister and the speaker of the parliament, which on the other hand is posed to 
provide supreme legislative support and control over the quality of implementation by the 
government.180  In essential terms, the president, the speaker of the parliament, and the 
prime minister are responsible for the implementation of a legally binding National 
Security Concept, first adopted by the parliament in 1994. The prime minister, and thus the 
government as a whole, is responsible for defense capability development and 
modernization in line with national security needs.181 The parliament is responsible for 
exercising democratic civilian control over the armed forces, along with the defense-related 
committees, the prime minister, and the civilian defense minister.182  
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The parliament of Mongolia (the State Great Hural) is constitutionally empowered 
to determine the basis for and initiate changes in the security and defense policies on its 
own accord. The parliament is the major institutional stronghold for democracy in 
Mongolia, along with a constitution that enables parliament to occasionally overcome the 
influence of popular presidents or neutralize debilitating effects of single-party dominance 
over the government and president portfolios.183 Also the parliament exercises its 
oversight authority through parliamentary hearings and deliberations of highest state 
representatives, capable of obtaining all necessary documentation, mostly through the 
standing committees, subcommittees, and parliamentary oversight groups. Nonetheless, a 
high level of political corruption has undermined parliament’s credibility and effectiveness 
in utilizing existing instruments for parliamentary control and oversight of the security 
sector.  
The post-Soviet judicial system, like other branches of governance in Mongolia, 
faces the same challenges of politicization and corruption. Furthermore, intensive expert 
and technical assistance have been directed from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and German Development Corporation (GTZ) since 1990, which 
aimed to enhance impartiality and professionalism through the institutional development 
of an effective and efficient judiciary.184 Mongolia’s traditional judicial experience 
includes military courts, which were acting upon the principle of collective decision-
making performed by mostly unqualified judges or prosecutors.185 Military courts were 
dissolved in 1993 by the parliament, and military justice was transferred under the 
prerogative of civil courts, positioned to be impartial and subject only to the central judicial 
legislation.186  
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The civic sector in Mongolia is characterized as active and growing in numbers. 
This image, however, does not necessarily imply the timely delivered practical results 
when it comes to the political, financial, or administrative civic capacity aimed at 
enhancing democratic checks and balances in Mongolia. For instance, an effort to enable 
the state to introduce key legislation on the freedom of public information in 2005, which 
required an alliance of ten NGOs to unite under a wider anti-corruption agenda, struggled 
with controversial political-procedural maneuvers that delayed the process of adoption as 
much as possible.187  
The scarcity of pro-democracy civic activism significantly derives from the fact 
that Mongolian society has suffered totalitarian regime suppression under Communist 
Party rule. As soon as party propaganda and media censorship were lifted, civil society 
encouraged by the democratic environment reemerged in Mongolia in a dynamic and 
politically influential manner, and thus quickly garnered acknowledgment by international 
organizations and Western counterparts.188 In contrast to other post-Soviet states, 
however, Mongolia due to its geographical location was limited in possibilities to join 
international organizations promoting democracy such as NATO or the EU. Thus, the 
popular support for democracy in Mongolia has been mostly self-empowering, aiming at 
preserving sovereignty and national identity.189 This reality has led to weaker public 
demand for further institutional enhancement of the civil society, which has lacked 
effective instruments to influence the decision-making process in the country 
democratically and deliver tangible results.  
The legacy culture of restrictive control over the mainstream media has formed 
through a century-long process of press and media development in Mongolia, including the 
last two decades of freedom and relative independence from the total political control 
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exercised by the Communist government, aimed at escaping the image of a servant to state 
ideological propaganda. Fundamental rights for freedom of speech and expression, as well 
as the right to be informed, are guaranteed by the Mongolian constitution and subsequent 
legal acts that also prohibit state ownership or censorship of the media. Nevertheless, the 
media in Mongolia is caught between political and business interests, and thus has lacked 
public trust and confidence.190 Overall, the politicized media lacks credibility and public 
service focus, posing additional challenges to democratic civilian control over the security 
sector in Mongolia.  
2. The Executive and CMR 
CMR in Mongolia unfolds in conditions of continuous rivalry between the two 
major political groups, the reformed former communist Mongolia’s People’s Party and the 
Democratic Party. Despite political stability in terms of peaceful transfer of power, 
longstanding single-party domination over the branches of power and direct political 
control at lower levels of governance generates fundamental impediments to democratic 
civilian control of the security sector. Also, notwithstanding the impressive ability of the 
Mongolian people to adapt to new complex realities in a rapidly consolidated democratic 
spirit in the country, the problem of corruption persists in all sectors of governance, 
occasionally increasing whenever the economic tempo accelerates, and additional income 
incentivizes corrupt appetites.191  
As the chair of the NSC, the president provides guidance to the government on 
national security issues, proposes a declaration of a state of emergency or war to the 
parliament, and upon its approval the president is responsible to lead the crisis management 
process in the country. In parallel, the president enhances inter-agency security cooperation 
between the executive and judicial branches, while the political party membership gets 
suspended during the execution of presidential duties and responsibilities, aimed at 
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enabling bipartisan unity of action and national security collaboration.192 The national 
security concept further defines the responsibilities and authority of NSC.193 High 
attention to the effectiveness and efficiency in times of emergency and crisis management 
gives the president authority to extend the NSC framework and transform it into a higher 
committee. This authority is set to ensure effective and efficient decision-making and 
coordination while employing scarce state resources in line with legal norms and 
requirements.194 
At the same time, the president is equipped with the right to propose the peacetime 
NSC composition to the parliament if needed.195 In peacetime the NSC is tasked with 
regular review of the national security concept and subsequent legislation, to provide 
directions and solutions to the challenges of practical implementation of the defined 
security agenda based on factual research and analysis. Such reviews aim to reinforce 
national unity through ensuring constitutional human rights and freedoms, protecting 
national cultural heritage, as well as preserving the intellectual capacity and genetic pool 
of Mongolia. The NSC leads state defense policy development and makes structural-
organizational decisions regarding the armed forces and initiates changes reflecting 
Mongolia’s national interests and security needs.196  
Also, the chief of staff of the armed forces and the head of the general intelligence 
agency report directly to the NSC, which is supported by a group of experts, advisors, and 
reporting staff, led by the NSC secretary and office.197 The rest of the high political 
spectrum, such as the chairman of the standing committee, and the party leaders are eligible 
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to participate in NSC meetings for additional national security consultations, while final 
decisions by the NSC are made based on consensus.198 Cabinet members are managed in 
a centralized manner by the prime minister, who is bound to execute the president’s 
directives, while the defense ministry is determined to initiate a defense capacity 
development process such as the mid-term defense reform programs or policies. These 
policies are set to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the armed forces within the 
defined roles and missions by seeking NSC’s approval, which later submits 
recommendations to the parliament for voting.199 At the same time, to expand political 
leverage even further the president initiated changes in 2016 to increase the NSC’s 
authority, but the parliament decided not to act upon it and sent it back to the president. 
These dynamics reflect the culture of politicization of security decision-making at the level 
of national command, practiced by the president, the chairman of the parliament, and the 
prime minister, who is often associated with the same political party as the president, and 
thus, the political balance between the branches of power provided by the NSC mostly 
serves to coordinate narrow single-party political interests.200 
Bruneau, Matei, and Sakoda, referring to several years of interaction with 
Mongolian representatives, posited in 2009 that the unique configuration of the NSC aims 
at the balance of political power and prevention of one-man rule in the country. Such 
balance is enhanced by the national security documents developed and adopted with the 
United States’ support, aimed at improving the NSC’s capacity to coordinate many state 
institutions, all responsible to contribute to national security.201 Nevertheless, concerns 
have been raised in terms of reforms of the intelligence services and their deficient capacity 
for policy implementation and effective and efficient accomplishment of defined roles and 
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missions.202 DCAF observes inconsistencies in the existing setting highlighting that the 
president chairing the NSC is problematic, since it is not a structural part of the executive 
branch, and the prime minister is represented in the council without any other cabinet 
member, including the minister of defense.203 Besides, made decisions despite being 
formally advisory, in practice, all institutions are procedurally obliged to report on the 
progress to NSC regularly.204  
The lack of effective organizational capacity of the ministry of defense derives from 
the absence of political will to decentralize defense governance to a degree that would 
enable the constant effort of the ministry to be translated into the credible national defense 
or the military strategy.205 Thus, the political leadership in the ministry serves as an 
instrument to exercise centralized political control over the defense bureaucracy and 
administration, rather than to ensure comprehensive defense policy and strategy 
development through the control of the budgetary and procurement process in conditions 
of objective civilian control. The MOD controls only part of government defense budget 
allocations and even though the portfolio is owned by the minister, the chief of general 
staff has full control over the operational expenses and can authorize the spending three 
times higher than the minister.206 In addition, frequent turnover of defense ministers leads 
to a replacement of essential management with outsiders, even placement of civilians in 
the armed forces as commissioned officers. Political affiliations of such personnel have 
undermined military professionalism and led to the politicization of civil-military 
interaction beyond the ministry of defense.207 These problems are not compensated by 
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politically unbiased oversight, since audit reports are a mere formality, despite the well-
defined functional and organizational capacity of the state audit in Mongolia.208 
Western values-based education and training in the English language have become 
a matter of key developmental choice for Mongolian officers and NCOs. This trend 
gradually replaces elements of Communist party control in military career planning or 
decision-making, even though some nostalgia towards Russian military culture and 
equipment still can be observed.209 Also, continuous assistance provided by the United 
States has equipped Mongolian civilian and military leadership with fresh ideas for 
modernization, especially in terms of peacekeeping roles and missions.210 
3. The Legislature and CMR  
The parliament determines the basis and initiates changes into security and defense 
policies on its own accord.211 The parliament approves the annual state budget in line with 
the Law on Rules of Procedure of the State Great Hural through four pre-defined phases. 
The Parliament has the formal power to act and change NSC setting to streamline it with 
international best practices, but no such action has been observed so far.212  Also exercises 
its oversight authority through parliamentary hearings and deliberations of highest state 
representatives, capable of obtaining all necessary documentation, mostly through the 
standing committees, subcommittees, and parliamentary oversight groups. Such groups are 
created regularly and along with the State Audit Office conduct oversight at the 
organizational levels.213 The main source generating relevant data and reporting necessary 
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for effective parliamentary oversight is the financial performance and compliance audits 
conducted by the National Audit Office performing according to the Law on State Audit. 
This office along with regular financial audit evaluates management quality and procedural 
gaps in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.214 The intelligence and other special services 
are subject to oversight by a special subcommittee, which approves their budgets as 
well.215 Audit reports and recommendations are regularly submitted to the relevant 
committees, but no measures have been reported in response to provided recommendations, 
turning them into a mere formality, thus standing committees have not exercised their 
powers to a needed extent.216 No specific procedure is defined for the defense budget, as 
it proceeds similarly to other sectors, while the standing committee on the budget has a 
final say, turning the latter into a prime decision-maker on the defense policy after all. Also, 
at times, temporary working groups set to prepare defense budget proposals fail to reach 
consensus, thus creating delays or failing to discuss the proposed defense budget at the 
plenary session of the parliament.217 
The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) observes that despite 
existing mechanisms established to enhance democratic checks and balances, giving the 
parliament formal powers to demand and control the government’s effectiveness and 
efficiency, the number of such activities has been notably low since 1992.218 For instance, 
the prime minister had reported to the committee only once by 2012, and the defense 
minister had done the same in 2015, while the intelligence services have appeared before 
the standing committee only twice.219 When it came to decisions on matters of social 
security and well-being, however, the standing Committee on Security and Foreign policy 
acted with determination and rejected the government’s proposal on reducing 
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compensations to military personnel initiated in the state budget in 2016, repeating the 
same action in 2017.220 Nevertheless,  as Marc S. Jacob and Greta Schenke report in 2019 
through analysis of conditions of institutional trust in Mongolia, public trust towards the 
Mongolian parliament is traditionally lower than that of the directly elected president 
representing a single person, while the perception of corruption further degrades 
institutional trust towards the parliament.221 
4. Judicial Review  
The five-year-long institutional development strategy was set to achieve 
independence, responsiveness, transparency, and accountability of the Mongolian 
judiciary.222 The Judicial General Council (JGC), which is a separate body within the 
judicial system, is constitutionally set to guarantee the independence of judges, while being 
responsible for the organizational performance of the courts; however, the president and 
the parliament continue to gain political leverage over the judiciary.223 Judicial reforms 
lack public focus and scrutiny, which traditionally has been more oriented on the 
government’s actions aimed at overcoming immediate socio-economic challenges. The 
three-tier system of courts is specified by the Constitution and includes the supreme court, 
courts of appeal, and first instance courts, all covered by the National Anti-Corruption 
Strategy (2016−2023) and aimed at progress in terms of transparency, independence, and 
integrity of the judiciary.224  
Nevertheless, the president is involved in all key career decisions, for instance, in 
the case of the appointment of heads and members of the Judicial Qualifications and Ethics 
Committees or when the nominations for the role of supreme court judges are first agreed 
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to with the parliament and finally submitted to the president for approval.225 In 2019 the 
concerted action of the president and the parliament led to further limitation of judicial 
independence through legal amendments granting “the president, prime minister and the 
speaker of parliament the authority to dismiss both these positions and all judges without 
justification before their terms of office expire”.226 Due to the poor quality of judicial 
decisions, public trust and confidence in the judiciary have undergone a notable decline 
since 2005. The Independent Authority for Anti-Corruption (IAAC), despite several high-
level convictions or the ongoing investigations, has lacked independence and thus 
credibility.227 Single-party domination involves the political affiliation of judges with 
members of the parliament and government, performing with the communist legal 
psychology.228At the same time such post-Soviet legacies as passive civic engagement, a 
corrupt and politicized judiciary, as well as free but politically or financially biased media 
are unable to exercise objective scrutiny or build public trust in security institutions.229  
5. Informal Oversight 
The Western democratic world has acknowledged the state of civil society in 
Mongolia as vibrant and dynamically growing; however, only a few works have addressed 
the study of civil society in Mongolia comprehensively.230 Steven Fish and Michael 
Seeberg observe that the adoption of the Law on Information Transparency and Right to 
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Access Information has led to practical results, affecting established governance practices 
such as secretive budgets and finances, and the state procurement process, reflected in 
improved global rankings by 2015, and the authors remain optimistic of further progress if 
civil society continues its consolidation in Mongolia.231  Nevertheless, notable concerns 
have been raised by Mongolian human rights activists in response to the draft law initiated 
in 2019 that mimics restrictions on civil society in Russia, Poland, and Hungary.232  This 
initiative implies monitoring of NGOs in terms of foreign financial donations and support, 
through the Civil Society Development Council. Meanwhile the methodology that would 
determine the credibility of foreign-funded NGOs is unclear, raising fears that new 
institutions will serve as instruments for the suppression of politically undesired 
organizations or civic groups.  
The media environment in Mongolia mostly operates under self-censorship and its 
funding relies on the ongoing political attitude of the government or the political and 
business elite in general.233 The principles of transparency and of accessibility to private 
media shareholder information are addressed in the national security concept, however, the 
DCAF study addressing the question  “Why are journalists not interested in getting 
involved in investigative journalism?” reveals that nearly 90 percent of journalists would 
avoid such a field due to the high risks of intimidation and life-threatening physical or legal 
suppression, while no protection is guaranteed by the media owner and because reports 
produced are eventually disregarded by the law or the courts.234 
B. ANALYSIS 
The following analysis is built on the control-effectiveness framework and 
requirements developed by Bruneau, Matei, and Halladay addressing institutional control 
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mechanisms, inculcation of professional norms, and oversight by the legislative and 
judicial branches as well as civil society. Relevant values ranging from “low” to “medium” 
and “high” for each requirement are assigned to None, Inconsistent, and Full application 
of requirements for democratic control in practice. A summary of findings is presented in 
Table 2.  
Table 2. Requirements for Democratic Civilian Control in Mongolia 
Requirement Institutional  
Mechanisms 
Oversight Professional  
Norms 
Value Low Low Medium 
1. Requirements for Institutional Control Mechanisms 
Mongolia scores low in the Institutional Control Mechanisms category. Despite 
existing institutional preconditions for democratic civilian control over the security sector 
in Mongolia, the highest executive political authorities have regularly politicized the 
governance process. The NSC serves the purpose of political power-balance and 
compromise between the president, the speaker of the parliament, and the prime minister. 
Thus, most of the security decisions are made at the highest executive and legislative levels, 
while the ministry of defense mostly serves the purpose of civilian-administrative control 
over the armed forces, rather than to exercise control over the budget and policy 
development or their implementation. The existing legal framework addresses matters 
related to the performance of the armed forces and quality of its overall management 
emphasizing civilian supremacy, political impartiality, discipline, effective and timely 
decision-making, rather than Western-style institutional control, decentralized 
management, or checks and balances.235 The direct political control or interference through 
lower levels of defense decision-making reflects Soviet-style political leadership and 
management rather than effective democratic civilian control.236  
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It can be argued that the overall institutional framework for national security in 
Mongolia may serve as an effective consensus-building mechanism; however, the 
utilization of the NSC as a political power-balancing mechanism can significantly affect 
objective and depoliticized security decision-making in the country. The NSC, along with 
its secretary and office, remain attached to the president, leaving the image more of a 
presidential institution rather than a politically neutral institutional mechanism for effective 
and efficient national security decision-making.237 Besides, even though the prime 
minister is the most influential politician in the country responsible for the government, the 
power to initiate or veto the legislation and confirm the prime minister or cabinet members 
gives the president strong formal and political grounds for supremacy.238 Furthermore, 
despite the defense ministry’s legal authority as the primary source of defense policy and 
strategy development in the country, it lacks significant organizational capacity in terms of 
funding and human capital that would enable such delivery. At the same time, the minister 
of defense requires clear policy directives and support from the government, the president, 
the parliament, or the NSC to initiate institutional reforms.239 
2. Requirements for Oversight  
In the Requirements for Oversight category, Mongolia also ranks low. Despite the 
parliament’s notable political power and ability to make critical interventions and 
decisions, as in the case of Lithuania, in Mongolia routine parliamentary oversight lacks 
effectiveness and efficiency. This challenge is attributed to existing mechanisms and 
procedures, which, notwithstanding the notable audit capacity and institutional checks and 
balances, do not allow comprehensive and timely oversight and effective response to the 
practical challenges. These challenges are directly attributed to the culture of single-party 
domination that restricts further development and effective utilization of existing 
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mechanisms and instruments for effective democratic civilian control.240 At the same time, 
political corruption has been a major problem in Mongolia, attributed mostly to political 
parties, which are perceived as the most corrupt institutions. Party financing aspects are 
unclear and existing loopholes in regulations of political party financing generate notable 
risks of illegal funding from unverified sources.241 
These risks are not mitigated by the informal oversight by civil society and the 
media. Western concepts of democracy, equal access to free-market relations, and 
transparent and accountable governance have been introduced in Mongolia through civic 
engagement focused on capacity development, advocacy, and lobbying for standards or 
requirements attributed to liberal democracy and funded mostly through international 
partners.242 However, civic engagement in Mongolia is heavily complicated by the 
politicized judiciary and overall deficiency of resources for the civil-society capacity 
development, as reflected in the largely tolerated rise of corruption, lack of transparency, 
and accountability embedded in a culture of single-party domination.243 In summary, civil 
society in Mongolia is vibrant and robust in number but lacks essential strength to push 
back growing illiberal tendenciesnotwithstanding the occasional progress and 
considering the lack of state funding and looming restrictions on foreign support.  
3. Requirements for Professional Norms 
In the category of Requirements for Professional Norms Mongolia ranks medium. 
Mongolian armed forces have undergone both a cultural and organizational makeover 
while implementing a policy for high-quality peacekeeping engagement. The 
institutionalization of peacekeeping as one of the core missions for the Mongolian armed 
forces has resulted in major achievements in terms of the democratization of CMR in 
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Mongolia.244 The communist-style military command and control are gradually turning 
into the delegation culture, and the overall socialization process has distanced itself from 
the ideological and repressive party control and Soviet-style military doctrines. This 
process was strongly enhanced by political support and democratic acknowledgment in the 
Western world, especially the nonbinding, strategic support by the United States, and 
access to modern military education at all levels. Such access has allowed Mongolian 
armed forces to internalize democratic norms and values at operational and tactical 
decision-making levels, backed by active civilian leadership support.245  
Nevertheless, democratic CMR enhanced only through the Westernization of 
military culture for the sake of successful peacekeeping and international recognition is 
insufficient for successful democratic control at the national command and sectoral level, 
which is necessary specifically in conditions of territorial defense and existing 
constitutional-legal basis. The rest of the security sector such as the police, border troops, 
and the intelligence services were not exposed to Western concepts and expert support, and 
thus have remained in legacy conditions of leadership and management antithetical to 
democratic norms and values. These services have been exposed only to the limited 
development offered by Russia and China that feed on examples of authoritarian security 
governance.246 In contrast to these organizations failing to protect the basic public good 
democratically, the armed forces in Mongolia enjoy the image of the most reformed and 
credible security institution.247 Such progress fails to have a spillover effect on the rest of 
the security sector due to the low degree of interoperability between security 
institutions.248 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Even though the overall CMR legal framework in Mongolia is supportive of 
democratic defense governance, democratic progress stands at the sidelines of 
constitutional-legal imperatives rather than at the center of the initiatives that led to 
fundamental CMR reforms since the 1990s. Notwithstanding the dynamic post-Soviet legal 
reforms aimed at better organization and management of the military, challenges in the 
interactions between the ministry of defense and the military command are not addressed, 
highlighting the persisting culture of secrecy and inclination to keep defense and security 
matters away from the public focus.249 The longstanding single-party domination 
undermines the constitutionally acknowledged principle of democratic civilian control in 
objective terms and carries an embedded risk of constant politicization of the security 
institutions.250  
Overall, the combination of significant internal political, cultural, and external 
economic-security trends determines the post-communist nature of the Mongolian CMR 
and reflects the pragmatic democratic choice made by the Mongol society. This 
pragmatism has led Mongolia to notable democratic, socio-economic, and security 
achievements while preserving its independence and gaining international recognition.251 
On the other hand, it seems that this pragmatism lacks an essential political stimulus aimed 
at a deeper level of national command impacting the entire security sector, and thus 
prevents credible security governance and further democratic consolidation. The political 
culture of single-party domination over security decision-making translates into illiberal 
and corrupt practices at institutional and organizational levels and impacting all state 
institutions, especially the judiciary and overall justice system. Positive trends reflecting 
the inculcation of democratic norms and values by the military at operational and tactical 
levels cannot neutralize the aforementioned legacy.  
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IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS  
Notwithstanding their divergent paths to democratization, the common character of 
CMR challenges observed in Lithuania and Mongolia is a struggle to implement 
democratic civilian control because the highest political actors in those states have 
politicized security governance. Strong additional external and internal political, socio-
economic, and security incentives are necessary to overcome existing legacies and enable 
further democratic security reforms and consolidation in the post-Soviet world. Painful 
post-communist democratic transition in these countries on one hand resulted in widely 
acknowledged foundations for democratic CMR but on the other developed insufficient 
executive, legislative, and judicial frameworks, failing to ensure depoliticized security 
governance. In all three cases, these frameworks lack effective tools to enable democratic 
civilian control at the institutional or organizational levels; the development of such tools 
requires long-term reforms, cultural adaptation, and credible change management. At the 
same time, the legacy of civic passivity weakens possibilities for informal oversight or 
public scrutiny of ongoing policies and their outcomes. These observations apply 
meaningfully to the author’s home country of Georgia, as well. 
To further depoliticized security governance in Lithuania, Mongolia, and Georgia, 
tailored support for uninterrupted democratic reforms provided by the Western democratic 
world is necessary. Otherwise, persistent illiberal political, institutional, or cultural legacies 
will most likely continue turning the national security governance into a space for narrow 
political power-balancing rather than objective security decision-making, risking the crisis 
of legitimacy and acceleration of the democratic decline in the post-Soviet space.  
A. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
The present research proves the first two hypotheses of this thesis incorrect because 
none of these former Soviet countries struggles with the lack of military subordination to 
civilian orders or “shirking” as explained by Feaver, nor do they reflect the high military 
prerogatives challenging democratic civilian control. The third hypothesis, addressing the 
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lack of civilian expertise and disinterest in defense reforms, stands partially correct. Table 
3 summarizes the main findings. 
Table 3. The Applicability of Findings to Hypotheses 
Hypothesis “Shirking” High military 
influence/
prerogatives 
Lack of expertise or 
interest in reforms 
Applicability Low Low Partial 
 
Lithuania and Mongolia are similarly situated with regards to the first hypothesis 
of this thesis—that the armed forces’ refusal to carry out the missions assigned by the 
civilian authorities weakens democratic civilian control. Lithuanian military branches have 
increased their professionalism in Huntingtonian terms while striving for NATO 
membership. Similarly, the Mongolian civil-military interaction has been harmonized 
around the international peacekeeping role of the armed forces. In both cases, the military 
has largely acknowledged Western democratic values and norms promoting military 
subordination to civilian orders. Significant domestic and international efforts enabled 
post-Soviet cultural adaptation at lower levels of military command, while the legacy 
culture of communist-style obedience appears to have played in favor of unhindered 
civilian control at early stages.  
The second hypothesis arguing that continued military prerogatives also challenge 
democratic civilian control because the military remains the de facto defense and security 
decision-makers—as emphasized by Bruneau, Matei, and Halladay—does not apply to 
Lithuania or Mongolia. This study reveals the partial relevancy of the third hypothesis, 
asserting namely that challenges to democratic civilian control over the security sector in 
Lithuania and Mongolia reflect the lack of civilian expertise in defense and security matters 
or insufficient interest in military reforms, which halts defense reform and defense 
decision-making progress. Indeed, the intensive Western effort in terms of education, 
training, and expert support to both countries over more than two decades translates into 
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the ability to successfully emulate Western practices, especially in Lithuania. Therefore, 
civilian defense leadership in Lithuania and Mongolia do not suffer from a lack of 
expertise, but more from an insufficient interest in deeper institutional and cultural reforms, 
which are largely discouraged by the legacy culture of direct political interference in 
leadership and management of the defense establishment. The strong presidential influence 
in Lithuania reaches lower levels of defense governance and undermines the institutional 
autonomy of the MND and the credibility of the defense minister, disrupting the military 
professionalism and subordination by directly interacting with lower-level military 
commanders. Frequent changes in leadership and staffs limit defense ministers and high 
military command from focusing on the long-term development of credible tools to manage 
resources effectively and efficiently or guarantee credible internal control.  
On the other hand, in Mongolia, the civilian defense leadership is set to exercise 
mostly administrative control over the armed forces and fully depends on the decisions of 
the president and the NSC to initiate any policies or meaningful institutional changes. 
Notwithstanding the different degrees of centralization in both cases, decisions at national, 
institutional, and organizational levels primarily derive from political considerations and 
influence rather than objective developmental needs. The lack of political will and 
determination hinders anti-corruption reforms, delivering mostly mediocre results that are 
unable to neutralize corrupt practices persisting in all branches of governance, including 
the judiciary. Also, the political and financial bias of the media and pro-democratic civic 
passivity, in aggregate, create unfavorable conditions for further democratic consolidation 
in Lithuania and Mongolia, despite credible electoral systems and an established tradition 
of peaceful transfer of power.  
B. COMPARATIVE SUMMARY 
Post-Soviet democratic civilian control in Lithuania and Mongolia faces a lack of 
political will and determination to implement long-term democratic defense reforms and 
transformation. This major deficiency combined with political leaders’ limited culture of 
delegation and decentralization, as well as a legacy inclination to exercise direct political 
control at lower levels of security governance, may lead to a crisis of legitimacy not only 
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for elected governments and the policy decisions they make but for the democratic way of 
the rule as such. This perspective underlines the higher importance of democratic CMR 
reforms in the post-communist space while facing the critical challenge of democratic 
decline in general.  
Expectations that the evolutionary process of political, socio-economic, and 
cultural adaptation to Western democratic values would take place in post-Soviet space 
were based on the experience of democratic reforms in the Western hemisphere through 
the gradual process of democratization. This sort of evolutionary adaptation has provided 
Western nations with greater political time to prepare and communicate the change 
effectively, gain and maintain a sufficient and necessary degree of public trust and 
confidence in policies, and continuously learn from mistakes. Legacies antithetical to 
Western democracy burden this evolution in Lithuania and Mongolia; therefore, strong 
political consensus and determination are necessary, aimed at the long-term development 
of institutional mechanisms or toolkits that enable transparent and accountable security 
governance at all levels.  
Lithuania created these mechanisms from scratch, while Mongolia adapted the 
Soviet-era ones; in both cases, such efforts lacked continuous and longstanding public 
interest in defense reforms and demand for democratic progress in all sectors of 
governance. Thus, political interference on lower levels of security governance has led to 
low organizational effectiveness and efficiency, politically biased personnel policies, a 
culture of excessive secrecy, and corruption in defense procurement, restricting the further 
practical implementation of democratic civilian control. At the same time, the intensive 
international support from the United States, NATO, and the EU aimed at strengthening 
the democratic stability and quality in Lithuania and Mongolia have motivated political 
elites to deal with long-term reforms and enhanced continuity of development. This support 
has also strengthened public confidence in the democratic process. Both in Lithuania and 
Mongolia, Western support and recognition have significantly contributed to the improved 
public image of the military, enabling increased funding and development. Nonetheless, if 
such support is provided without firm anticipation of the conceptual divide and continues 
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to encourage the culture of imitation and free-riding, it is less likely to result in objective 
civilian control or democratic progress.  
C. CORRELATION OF FINDINGS WITH CHALLENGES OF 
DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL IN GEORGIA 
Ultimately, this research makes clear that the challenges and legacies undermining 
democratic civilian control of the security sector in Lithuania and Mongolia strongly 
correlate with challenges observed in another post-Soviet consolidating democracy, 
Georgia. Table 4 summarizes the findings reflecting the status of challenges in Georgia. 
Table 4. Requirements for Democratic Civilian Control in Georgia 
Requirement Institutional  
Mechanisms 
Oversight Norms 
Value Low Low Medium 
 
As in the cases of Lithuania and Mongolia, Georgia has achieved considerable 
democratic progress recognized by NATO, the EU, and other partners actively supporting 
democratic security reforms in the country. CMR in Georgia is built upon the 
Huntingtonian model of objective civilian control. The post-Soviet constitutional-legal 
framework is supportive of democratic civilian control of security institutions; thus, the 
civilian political leadership leads the defense and security policy decision-making in the 
country.252 At the same time, democratic civilian control of the security sector in Georgia 
closely resembles conditions observed in Mongolia reflecting the culture of direct 
centralized political control/interference exercised at all levels of security governance. 
Such interference undermines the adequate development of institutional control 
mechanisms and hinders the credibility of security institutions. This legacy thwart 
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transparent and accountable leadership and depoliticized management at organizational 
levels. The parliament, judiciary, civil society, and the media are unable to exercise 
objective and productive oversight or public scrutiny.  
As in the case of Lithuania, substantial financial and expert support, provided 
through education and training programs provided by the United States, NATO, and other 
partners, has delivered tangible results at operational and tactical levels of civil-military 
interaction in Georgian defense.253 Moreover, the regular participation of Georgian forces 
in peacekeeping and anti-terrorist operations along with Western contingents has 
contributed to the increased professionalism of the Georgian military.254 Yet persisting 
post-Soviet legacies related to nepotism, corruption, and political interference by dominant 
political figures in the lower levels of the defense governance have undermined the CMR 
balance in the country, often turning into subjective control of the military.255 Throughout 
2003–2019, problems related to the democratic defense institution building were 
insufficiently addressed at the level of NSC. Instead, such institution building has been 
dominated initially by the powerful president and, more recently, the prime minister, and 
the process was subject to frequent changes of secretaries as well as NSC staff members.256 
Therefore, despite substantial support from Western partners to set up coordinating or 
advisory functions, the NSC has generated limited institutional capacity or credibility to 
enable objective, fact-based security analysis and decision-making.  
Similarly, as in the case of Mongolia, the Georgian parliament’s institutional 
authority for democratic oversight of the security sector is diminished by the government 
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and powerful presidents as well as the prime ministers.257 Thus, parliamentary oversight 
of the security sector has been mostly superficial, politically biased, and ineffective. At the 
same time, the Georgian judiciary also lacks credibility and is regularly accused of political 
bias. The civil society, including the media, suffers from a low degree of public trust and 
confidence in the security sector due to deficient professionalism and political or financial 
bias in this area.258 
1. The Executive and CMR 
Although it is to a lesser degree in Lithuania than in Mongolia, in both cases the 
executive control is strongly influenced by the political interests of individual political 
leaders and their party. The national security decision-making at the level of the SDC in 
Lithuania is problematic due to the politicization of the process by the highest political 
actors, mostly by presidents. While in Mongolia the frequent changes of NSC secretaries, 
as well as staff members, further limits the institutionalization of depoliticized security 
decision-making at the level of national command. Similarly, in Georgia, because of 
continuous constitutional reforms, the NSC underwent yet another reshuffle and became a 
consultative body directly subordinated to the prime minister of Georgia in 2019.259 The 
aim is to support the highest level of national security decision-making as well as to 
exercise a major coordinating role in terms of national security policy development and 
planning.260  
The 2019 constitution sets the president as the commander in chief of Georgian 
Defense Forces (GDF).261 The president can act in defense and security matters, whether 
it be a declaration of war or a national emergency based only on the prime minister’s 
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request and parliament’s approval. In wartime, the formation of the national defense 
council (NDC) headed by the president is envisioned by the constitution; however, all 
essential executive decisions regarding the deployment of the armed forces or their 
employment lie under the prime minister’s authority. Other members of the council are the 
speaker of the parliament, the defense minister, and the chief of defense.262 In contrast to 
the wartime NDC, the reformed peacetime NSC under the prime minister has wider 
executive representation, including the ministers of internal and foreign affairs, the minister 
of finance, the head of the state security service, and the head of the intelligence service, 
but it excludes the speaker of the parliament.263 Nevertheless, the NSC still lacks 
institutional and organizational authority to enable depoliticized national security decision-
making and control over the implementation of needed policies. These conditions resemble 
findings on the NSC in Mongolia and SDC in Lithuania, where despite wider political 
representation the decision-making can be highly politicized by the powerful leaders. 
Consequently, the national security decision-making process in Georgia risks being 
dominated by narrow political party interests in a highly centralized manner.264  
Thomas Young observes that Georgia’s notable advance in defense reforms 
surprisingly lacks a permanent secretary or director of staff to ensure separation of political 
leadership from management.265 David Darchiashvili in the same spirit posits that 
notwithstanding the achieved results and dynamic reforms, personality-based domination 
by President Saakashvili from 2004 to 2013 politicized defense governance regularly 
through his direct interference in military affairs and evolved into subjective control of the 
military.266 Frequent changes in defense leadership, management, and personnel also 
caused institutional and organizational unpredictability, which was accompanied by 
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political interference in purely military matters and disregarded the institutional authority 
of high military command.267 Moreover, serious accusations were made that intelligence 
services and surveillance were utilized against political opponents.268  
Since 2013 a new political coalition under the leadership of billionaire Bidzina 
Ivanishvili has committed to the Euro-Atlantic path. Georgia signed an Association 
Agreement with the EU in June 2014. That same year the Substantial NATO-Georgia 
Package (SNGP) was initiated and aimed at achieving higher readiness and interoperability 
with NATO. Within the same framework in 2015, the NATO Joint Training and Evaluation 
Center (JTEC) and the Defense Institution Building School (DIBS) were established.269 
These efforts aim at better institutionalization of democratic defense governance and 
increased professionalism of the GDF interacting with NATO in regular multinational 
exercises.270  Nonetheless, the matter of transforming the legacy practice of direct political 
control and management of security institutions, including defense, remains unresolved. 
The necessary frameworks for objective defense leadership or transparent and accountable 
management are underdeveloped; thus, increased military professionalism has a limited 
institutional impact on the overall democratization of civil-military interaction in Georgian 
defense. The Defense Integrity Index 2020 published by TI places Georgia in the band C, 
the same moderate corruption risk category as Lithuania.271 TI identifies key challenges 
in terms of weak anti-corruption mechanisms, weak parliamentary oversight, insufficient 
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budget transparency, use of opaque procurement procedures, and inadequate protection of 
whistleblowers.272  
2. The Legislature and CMR 
Single-party domination over the legislative branch in Mongolia and institutional 
weaknesses of the Seimas in Lithuania both result in underdeveloped or unutilized 
mechanisms for parliamentary oversight and control. Such conditions limit space to hold 
strong presidents and the government accountable for decisions made or their outcomes. 
Again, the quality of parliamentary control and oversight in Georgia correspond more with 
conditions of longstanding single-party domination in Mongolia exerted by the highest 
political leaders, whether it be a president, the prime minister, or the speaker of the 
parliament. DCAF experts, as well as other scholars, report that despite multiple legal 
provisions empowering the parliament to execute its control and oversight functions, such 
execution has been a week and failed to turn into a routine process.273 The defense and 
security committee of the parliament has shown no “practice of thorough investigations on 
defense matters, defense budget, nor other independent actions―other than authorizing 
policies and actions taken by the Executive.”274 In addition, defense and security 
committee competence is mostly limited to budgetary control and has no essential authority 
to initiate audits or inspections in security institutions, while the high volume of secret 
procurements often has not been scrutinized effectively due to the lack of overall 
organizational capacity and qualified human resources.275  
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3. Judicial Review 
In the cases of Lithuania and Mongolia, the judiciary lacks credibility, public trust, 
and confidence because of legacies that allege political or financial biases to judges and 
corruption, as well as legacy bureaucracy limiting the transparency and accountability of 
the judiciary. Similarly, the Georgian judiciary is characterized by an institutional 
weakness to resist political pressure and interference due to the politicization of judicial 
reform.276 Also, all efforts to improve upon the systemic deficiencies in the judiciary have 
been undermined by the constant resistance to reform from within the judiciary itself.277 
Scholars report that the selection of Supreme Court members is a most challenging process 
since the transparency of the process is the major problem for the Georgian judiciary, 
considering that lifelong tenure was granted to the Supreme Court judges through a “highly 
dysfunctional and unprofessional” appointment process.278 At the same time, the Georgian 
chapter of Transparency International reports on corruption risks deriving from the flawed 
process of judicial appointments. TI emphasizes that the appointment of judges is 
conducted by a group of judges representing the High Council of Justice who enjoy 
excessive powers enabling the council to appoint and discipline judges in a selective and 
biased manner, overlooking the problematic professional background of some 
candidates.279     
4. Informal Oversight 
Civil societies in Lithuania and Mongolia struggle with the Soviet legacy passivity 
of civic engagement. Civic groups, notwithstanding international donor support, lack 
power and capacity to exercise productive informal oversight of the security sector. The 
media environment in both cases, despite being plural and diverse, often lacks 
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professionalism and public credibility due to political or financial bias. These conditions 
strongly resemble those in Georgia, where citizens are equally comfortable with political 
activity such as participation in elections, but mostly avoid memberships in mass 
organizations or associations.280 Also, a notable challenge for Georgian democratic civic 
groups is their severe dependency on external sources of financing due to the lack of culture 
for charity support or voluntary participation in civic movements in Georgian society.281  
Nevertheless, Freedom House reports that civil society in Georgia is “fairly robust:” 
some civic actors are included in policy discussions. Yet some face political pressure and 
public criticism by the government, including the judiciary, which was accused in 2020 of 
demonstrating governmental bias over the convictions of some activists.282 These 
conditions are further exacerbated by the pluralistic but partisan media environment. For 
example, the public broadcaster is often accused by civic groups of pro-governmental 
agenda setting. Meanwhile, long-running politicized disputes over the ownership of some 
media outlets have undermined the media’s independent capacity. The press freedom 
watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has raised concerns over the government’s 
efforts to generate legal and institutional limitations on media independence in Georgia, 
for instance through The National Communications Commission that enjoys extended 
possibilities for surveillance and censorship of media content and production on the 
market.283 Overall, the civil society in Georgia, including the media, fails to exercise 
effective informal oversight and influence on the government’s decisions, and similarly 
fails to enable meaningful institutional changes that would advance Georgia to a higher 
quality of democratic civilian control.  
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D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The Soviet legacy is reflected in politicized security governance and its impact on 
the quality of democratic civilian control in Lithuania, Mongolia, and Georgia. This legacy 
reveals a common post-Soviet pattern of problematic political, institutional, and cultural 
transformation from a highly centralized system of political control into the Western-style 
frameworks of decentralized leadership and management. Hence, although CMR reforms 
in Lithuania enjoyed popular public support inspired by NATO membership and security 
assurances, the focus on democratic defense reforms and modernization loosened as the 
membership was achieved, and mechanisms for democratic civilian control remain 
underdeveloped or unutilized.  
In contrast with Mongolia, the Lithuanian national security decision-making at the 
SDC level includes the minister of defense and the commander of the armed forces, but 
this fact could not neutralize problems of subjective presidential interference on lower 
levels of defense governance that undermine the MND’s institutional autonomy and 
credibility. Therefore, despite the development of a constitutional-legal basis for 
democratic civilian control, these achievements have had limited effect on transforming 
the legacy culture of political interference and institutional domination in Lithuania. 
The Mongolian democratic transition has been mostly self-empowering, 
incentivized by specific geopolitical needs and a third-neighbor policy aiming at 
partnership with the Western democratic world. Nonetheless, the international 
acknowledgment of Mongolia’s successful democratic transition was and remains 
insufficient to neutralize the negative effects of the longstanding Soviet-style single-party 
domination over all branches of governance in Mongolia. Similarly, despite being partially 
occupied by Russia, Georgia has made notable reforms that have enabled democratic 
progress inspired by prospects of NATO membership, but the state has struggled with 
continuity and institutional development due to the similar effects of longstanding single-
party domination. Therefore, painful post-Soviet democratic transition in all three cases 
has resulted in acknowledged but insufficient institutional and organizational frameworks 
for depoliticized leadership and management that lack effective instruments or tools 
necessary for the implementation of democratic civilian control.  
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Several factors influencing the development of leadership and management 
instruments and tools in post-Soviet democracies can be outlined and generalized. First is 
the combined lack of political interest and time to implement long-term institutional 
reforms in line with requirements for democratic control. The factor of insufficient political 
interest and time is evident in frequent changes in defense leadership and management in 
all three countries. Moreover, the development of necessary instruments may require 
merely enough political time to mobilize electoral support for the next electionsusually 
through promoting populistic or short-term policieswhich indicates the embedded bias 
and conflict between short-term narrow political and long-term institutional or 
organizational interests. 
Second, democratically elected governments cannot practically implement policies 
ensuring long-term democratic defense and security reforms partially due to the civilian 
defense leadership’s significant political responsibility for the quality of organizational 
performance that outweighs policy outcomes alone. Notwithstanding the well-emulated 
Huntingtonian model promoting objective democratic civilian control in Lithuania or 
Georgia, such political responsibility may force leaders to embrace a highly centralized 
management style, which often translates into a similar culture in the military context. The 
direct political responsibility for defense organizational management fuels the need for 
informal interpersonal trust between political leadership and key civilian or military staff, 
especially those that are directly subordinated to the ministers. The need for such trust often 
translates into the inclination towards nepotism and other biased human resource 
management practices that prioritize political trustworthiness and reliability of 
subordinated staff, and relegate merit, professionalism, or high career potential to a 
secondary position of importance.  
Third, the conflict between persisting legacies and Western models of de-
politicized governance regularly turns into misrule and mismanagement that can strongly 
undermine public trust and confidence in the defense establishment or other security 
institutions. Overlooking the requirements for objective democratic control often results in 
strategic mistakes, followed by a subsequent inclination to hide them or blame previous 
leadership or government administrations for these mistakes. As observed in Lithuania, 
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Mongolia, and Georgia, as soon as new political leadership enters its official role, yet 
another cycle of challenges related to effectiveness and efficiency repeats itself. In such 
circumstances, not surprisingly, internal, and external strategic communication policies are 
mainly employed to enhance the future electoral viability of the political leadership, which 
is accomplished by communicating achieved mediocre results with the public in the best 
marketable way. Meanwhile, failure in such communication further damages the credibility 
of the defense establishments. Consequently, the introduction or optimization of additional 
mechanisms strengthening depoliticized leadership, decentralized management, and 
institutional checks and balances are necessary at different degrees in all three cases.  
To strengthen the credibility of the security decision-making, a clear set of 
standards should be introduced at the level of national command. These standards must 
ensure transparent, fact-based, and rational strategic security decision-making through 
mechanisms such as the SDC in Lithuania or the NSC in Mongolia and Georgia. Such 
standards should also address principles and decision-making quality requirements at 
organizational levels in all security institutions, while the politically neutral directors-
general or permanent secretaries, as civil servants, must be positioned to guarantee 
depoliticized and decentralized management and internal control. 
These requirements strongly indicate the increasing significance of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (SAI), which are relatively independent of government control and act 
according to the objective quality standards. SAIs could play an important role in 
improving the quality of decision-making and building public trust and confidence in 
democratic security governance. For example, United States Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), which acts according to the Generally Accepted Government Auditing 
Standards (GAGAS), conducts systematic assessments of results delivered by federal 
institutions and their costs in frames of financial or performance audits, which are reported 
directly to Congress. Furthermore, consolidation of academic and research capacity could 
be critical for comprehensive and objective assessment of past, ongoing, and future policies 
or their effects. For example, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) provides 
comprehensive analytical support to the United States Congress and as an effective 
institutional support instrument helps Congress make objective and informed decisions. At 
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the same time, CRS work strengthens public confidence in the democratic process by 
guaranteeing that all-important matters to citizens will be covered and presented to the 
public. Comprehensive analytical support to the parliament, civic groups, and the media 
could enhance the productiveness of informal oversight for the security sector. Institutional 
tools such as CRS and the GAO closely correspond to critical needs to ensure democratic 
security governance, help reveal problems, find solutions in a transparent and accountable 
manner, and thus build public trust and confidence in successful post-Soviet democratic 
consolidation. 
The quality of democratization of CMR, and thus the effectiveness of institutional 
mechanisms for democratic civilian control at all levels of security governance, is critical 
for further consolidation in post-communist democracies. The existing democratic 
framework in these countries is caught between the need for long-term development of 
credible mechanisms for democratic control and a legacy culture of politicized security 
governance derived from narrow political interests, lacking the appetite and time for such 
complex long-term policies. Therefore, the main driver for democratic progress in the post-
Soviet world has been and remains the prospect of a Western democratic partnership that 
provides high political assurances and is tailored to practical needs developmental support. 
As a NATO member, Lithuania is expected to apply the relevant requirements for a higher 
quality of democratic civilian control and evolve effective institutional mechanisms over 
time. The factor of NATO membership can compensate for the lack of political time for 
long-term reforms and strengthen continuity of reforms through membership mechanisms. 
Nonetheless, unique and complex geopolitical and security conditions facing Mongolia and 
Georgia limit partners such as NATO or the EU from acting with more determination and 
further enhancing democratic progress in these countries. Therefore, despite a similar 
communist past or other commonalities, in terms of present-day challenges, the future 
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